THE ARYAN PATH

VOLUME XXXV · NO. 9

September 1964

EDITOR
Preparation for Citizenship
I: Democracy, a Spiritual Principle

ARTHUR L. HERMAN
Value Theory: East and West: I

LILA RAY
Science and Spirituality

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Browning for Today

BOOKS REVIEWED INCLUDE

Reality and Creative Vision in German Lyrical Poetry; *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*; *Jean-Paul Sartre: To Freedom Condemned*; Julian Huxley's *Essays of a Humanist*; *The Gulistan ... of* Sa'di; *The Efficacy of Public Enterprise*; *Kathakali*.

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as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

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SOPHIA WADIA

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SUBSCRIPTIONS

THE ARYAN PATH is published monthly. Subscriptions are annual, but may begin with any desired month. Orders, accompanied by the appropriate remittance, should be sent to the Editorial and Business Office, Bombay, or the London Office

RATES

	Single Copy	Annual Subscription
INDIA	Re. 1.25	Rs. 12.00
EUROPE	1*s.* 9*d.*	18*s.* (or equivalent)
THE AMERICAS	50 cents	$5.00 (or equivalent)

OFFICES

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICE	Theosophy Hall, 40 New Marine Lines Bombay 1
LONDON OFFICE	62 Queen's Gardens, London W. 2

Available in the U.S.A. from Eastern News Distributors 255 Seventh Avenue, New York 1, N.Y.

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— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXV SEPTEMBER 1964 No. 9

PREPARATION FOR CITIZENSHIP

I.—DEMOCRACY, A SPIRITUAL PRINCIPLE

[WE reprint this article from THE ARYAN PATH, September 1940.—ED.]

FRIENDS,

Today and on the following two afternoons we are going to study together an important subject. These three talks are neither the sermons of a preacher, nor the lectures of a professor; we are all students trying to aid each other, and if the task of speaking falls to my *karma,* that of responding with attention and with sympathy falls to yours; and as the relation between what is said and what is heard will continue for a while, so at least, I hope, you will use what you hear in your thought and in your speech; and even if you reject what I have to say and to submit, it will have set the current of your thought in motion. For this opportunity allow me to offer a word of thanks to the Council of your University and especially to your Vice-Chancellor, Shri N. S. Subba Rao.

It is a commonplace today to say that we live in an age when stupendous changes are taking place in every country of the world. People are talking of the decay of Western civilization, of the death of Europe. Pious optimists quote the Victorian Poet Laureate, Tennyson:

> The old order changeth yielding place to new,
> And God fulfils himself in many ways.

But they fail to tell us why God produced such a catastrophe as the war of 1914-18, and who that God is who, after fulfilling Himself through the carnage, the bloodshed, and the immorality of those tragic years, is now fulfilling Himself through unemployment, tyranny, and political robbery of the kind we saw some time ago in Abyssinia, a robbery blessed by the Pope himself!

Now there is no doubt that moral and mental chaos prevails in every

country of Europe and threatens every country of America — North, Central, South. And as the world is one, the effects of that chaos are bound to touch us here in India, and it is highly necessary that at the present hour we learn to think clearly and with calmness and try to locate the hidden roots of causes which have produced the mental and moral chaos all around us.

Let me at once present to you for consideration my reading of those root-causes.

The present world confusion is due to a false evaluation of the principle of Heterogeneity. Great differences in economic status, in moral character, in mental capacity, existed; the purpose and the value of these differences were not understood. This resulted, not in the failure of Pure Democracy, but in the failure of the so-called democracies of the pre-war era. The very basis and foundation of Democracy were falsely conceived. In pre-war Europe, in the days of Gladstone in politics, of Darwin in science, of Spencer in philosophy — I am naming them because British names are more familiar in India than Continental names — an effort was made to erect the Temple of Democracy on those falsely conceived foundations; and — the rain of passion descended, the floods of greed came, the winds of competition blew and beat upon that house; and it is falling; and great will be the fall of it presently.

Democracy is a spiritual institution like Religion. Therefore when an attempt is made to give it a materialistic form it becomes a dangerous and corrupting influence. European democracies reared upon materialistic ideas of life and of government produced the war, which is but a vivid symbol striking to human imagination. The present chaos is *not* due to the war; this chaos and the war itself but reflect the forces of anti-democratic ideas. Compare European democracies with modern Hinduism — overlaid as it is with many superstitions and much corruption. The Hindu faith, *Sanatana Dharma,* is not at fault; it is the false ideas held about it that make Hinduism appear a huge failure. Similarly, it is not Democracy which has failed in the West, but the false ideas and actions which were made to represent Democracy.

Coming to our own India, where a new political era is opening, we are face to face with a great test; it is a test similar to the one which Western democracies faced and did not pass. Let us understand this.

We in India possess the guidance of a spiritual philosophy of life and of government which we inherit from the ancient fathers of the race, the mighty *Pūrvajas*. The West also had the guidance of its Jesus, Plato, and Pythagoras, but the Occidental builders of democracies rejected Plato and the Platonists in favour of Aristotle and the Aristotelians; rejected Jesus, the practical mystic, and followed the sectarian churchmen. Now, this test

which Western countries met some centuries ago comes at the present time to our Motherland. Will the India of today accept or reject the spiritual Ancients — Krishna and Yagnavalkya, Buddha and Shankara, Ali and Omar, Zoroaster and Jesus? If she rejects them and accepts Western modes, Western policies, and the Western outlook, then India is bound to be enveloped by the moral and mental chaos which is destroying industrialized Europe.

Some of you might say that ancient ideas are not much good in these modern times; that you must be practical and move with the movement of the age. But do you know the old-world ideas? Have you tested their practicality? Do you really know the immense practicality of other-worldliness for the proper handling of the affairs of this world? We speak of Democracy; but what is the real basis and foundation of Democracy? It is to be found in the *Upanishads* and the *Gita*. Democracy in the final analysis is the rule of the people. What are people? What is *Prajā*? And what is the principle which underlies our common humanity?

The failure of Western democracies, as we just saw, lay in a false evaluation of the differences which exist in the State, in the Race, in Nature as a whole. Why and how did such a mistake come about? The place and the purpose of differences between man and man were misunderstood because the common human element at the back of these differences was not perceived. Democracy in practical working is bound to fail anywhere unless the spiritual basis of humanity is seen. Democracy, the rule of the people, is not so good and philosophical a term as the Sanskrit — *Swarāj*, Rule of the Self; immediately the important prefix *Swa* raises the question in our minds: Which constituent in our human composition is the Self? Western democracies proceeded on the basis that man was a social animal. When we speak of *Swarāj*, Self-Rule, to what do we refer?

There are two ideas which we need to keep clearly before us in the study of our subject.

First, *Swa-Rāj*, Self-Rule, may mean the rule of the animal Self — *Kāma-ātman*, the *Gita* names it. That is the sense which the Western democracies had in mind in working up their States, with what result we now know! Looking upon men and women as social animals competing each against the other, man against woman, capitalist against labour, factory-hand against farmer, and so forth, the organized governments of those peoples competed and are now competing against each other. To begin with, as the very starting point, we here in India ought to reject as false the definition of man as a social animal. We must reject the idea that man is a beast, even an evolving beast. What then is man?

Go to the other idea of and about *Swa*, the Self, which we come upon in the Upanishadic philosophy. Not *Kāma-ātman*, but that which is

designated as *Antarātman*. Recall the verse in the *Katha Upanishad*:

> Of the measure of the thumb, Purusha, the Spirit, dwells ever in the heart of all beings as the Inner Ego.

Note please, all beings — in Brahmana and Mlechchha, in Hindu and Muslim, and — may I add on behalf of my sex? — in man, but also in woman! This great teaching is the basis of Democracy, as also the reason for the title of this lecture — "Democracy, a Spiritual Principle." Is there a single *adhyāya* of the *Gita* which does not bring out this fundamental teaching? Who does not remember at this point of our study the first of Shri-Krishna's *Vibhūtis*, Divine Glories?

"I am the Atman, the Ego, seated in the hearts of all beings."

Note once again the universality — all beings, *sarva bhūta*. Numerous verses I could quote to you, but two more will suffice from the closing eighteenth chapter:

> There dwelleth in the heart of every creature, O Arjuna, the Master, *Ishvara*, who by his magic power causeth all things and creatures to revolve mounted upon the universal wheel of time. Take sanctuary with him alone, O Son of Bharata, with all thy Soul; by his grace thou shalt obtain supreme happiness, the eternal place.

Note once again — every creature has *Ishvara*.

Now make the application. The *Gita* and the *Upanishads* are not otherworldly; their instruction is for the right conducting of the business of this world. The whole of humanity has a spiritual aspect, a spiritual basis, a spiritual foundation. In these verses of the *Upanishads* and the *Gita* we come upon a definition of man which is very different from the one I named — man, the social animal. What is it? Man as God, an unfolding God, a God in the making, but in essence and substance already divine. Here is the basis of real Brotherhood — Universal Brotherhood. The One Spirit, the One Substance, endows every man and woman, every community and race, with the power to unite with the all, with the whole. Unless this principle of homogeneity or brotherhood is recognized we are bound to go wrong, as the West has gone wrong in estimating the differences which do exist — the principle of heterogeneity.

The ancient Sages do not say all bodies are of equal strength, all minds are of equal capacity, all characters are equally noble. That is the dream of *materialistic* socialism, and that concept which it is sought to realize is so unphilosophical that it has sometimes been called insane. Our ancient philosophy *does* recognize socialism — but spiritual socialism, as you will perceive as our study proceeds. Differences and differentiations exist in Nature, in the human kingdom, and will continue to exist. To try to do

away with them is to court failure. How does the Science of Spiritual Democracy explain this principle of heterogeneity? The closing verse of the *Maitri Upanishad* gives us the answer simply:

> For the sake of experiencing the true and the false, the Great Atman has a dual nature.

All of us, you and I, have a dual nature: first the homogeneous Self, the Self common to all; and secondly, the heterogeneous Self, the separated Self. Recall the image of the thirteenth *Gita*: the One Sun illumines everybody — that is the homogeneous Self, the innumerable rays which emanate from *Ravi*, the Sun, are different; and they become in the world-process the numberless heterogeneous selves. In the first aspect we find the basis of Spiritual Unity; in the second, the basis of differentiation, which also is spiritual. The differences of castes, classes, professions, and so on, which produce differences in social status, take on a new meaning when they are viewed from the correct spiritual viewpoint. Thus the Brahmana, for example, is not superior to the Shudra, but only different; and both contribute something to the common good. Each human being through his capacity and his character is different from other human beings, but each is fulfilling his own particular mission, and all are of equal value and importance.

This is the conception of the four castes which we find in the fourth and the eighteenth discourses of the *Gita*. Thus Spiritual Democracy aims not at destroying the differences, but at using them as of equal value to the individual as well as to Humanity as a whole. Man and woman are of equal value; labour and capital are of equal value; lawyers, doctors, engineers are of equal value. But the saint and the sinner are *not* of equal value. That point, however, we will come upon in our next lecture. Thus, in Spiritual Democracy the problem of unity in diversity is solved, just as in Vedanta Philosophy the problem of the One in the many is solved.

It is recognized on all sides that the greatest problem of Democracy is that of education. But looked at in the light of the spiritual basis of Democracy this problem also assumes a new form. Appropriately to our study we shall define education as the training of the Soul, through citizenship, for *Swa-Rāj*, Self-Rule. In the next two lectures we shall study a few details about the work of the citizen and the State. What we want now is to grasp certain principles, and one of them is the right perspective on education. Fundamentally, education is not a matter of the three R's; of literacy or illiteracy; of primary, secondary, and university courses. These and other factors have their place and value; but the fundamental principle of education is the gaining of the power of Self-Rule by every man, woman, and child.

Now, because the spiritual basis of Democracy was neglected, education has not been able to avert the confusion and the chaos which prevail. Are Occidental nations without educational achievements? Of course not. But has their wide-spread, universal education and the cent-per-cent literacy in so many lands brought order, rhythm, harmony, peace, and contentment? Consider: what is the outcome of education, whatever the method? Occidental communities and nations are made up of adults who have, as a rule, divided lives, unintegrated lives. This seemingly unimportant fact is in reality the root-cause of social chaos, which begets political rivalry and all the rest. The psychological disharmony in the individual citizen is the greatest problem awaiting solution. Between the head and the heart of man there is a strife which is more acute than the family problems of man and woman. Between the hands which are the instruments of action, and the head which is the instrument of thought, there is a war raging in the individual, compared to which the class-war between labour and capital is a small affair. The frustrated heart of the individual affects his very blood to such an extent that he experiences a living death, compared to which the pain of poverty is as nought. This disharmony in the individual is the first problem which education should and can solve, but no Western method of education has been able to achieve this so far.

Come to India now. This is our problem and a growing one. Our graduates, failed B.A.'s, and matriculated boys and girls are turned out into the wide world disintegrated beings. They are pale copies of Western boys and girls, and unless our educational method is revolutionized we will have, not battalions, but armies, of discontented minds who create mischief, of frustrated hearts who create immorality, of unemployed hands who create poverty.

This problem of education is the problem of Democracy and if the spiritual basis of Democracy is applied deliberately in educational reform we shall not only bring peace and prosperity to our India, but also set an example for the world to follow. But what do we mean when we refer to a spiritual and democratic basis for educational reform? We mean introducing that system of education which will make the citizen, within himself, as harmonious an entity as possible; which will remove, as far as it can be removed, the conflict between his own members — his head and his heart and his hands. This is one factor. There is another. The citizen of a Spiritual Democracy should be endowed with an education which will enable him to use his own life-profession, whatever it be, as the fulfilment of his citizenship. This and other points of educational reform we shall consider again.

In closing our study tonight, the conception of the State as an entity has to be considered from the point of view of Spiritual Democracy. That

there is a relation between the State and the citizen is acknowledged by everyone; but we are concerned with the nature of that relationship. The general concept is that the citizen exists for the State; such an extreme view is wrong and gives the State an unspiritual form. The citizen should not exist for the State; as a man he has obligations to humanity; as a human being he has intimate relations with the race as a whole. Spiritual Democracy requires that the State should exist for the citizen, for his betterment and growth. The State is a playground for human spiritual evolution. States and countries may be compared to the bodies of men which come to birth and die, while the citizen, like the immortal Soul of man, goes on, passing from state to state "experiencing the true and the false."

But the citizen derives from the State the benefits which have accumulated through generations of experience. Unaided by the institution of the State the citizen would lose much time. The Law of Interdependence functions between the citizen and the State, and the true position reveals itself when we reject the idea that the citizen exists for the state to which he belongs. Just as different castes and classes, the two sexes, the various professions, are avenues of human evolution, so also nations and countries and states are avenues of human progression and perfection. Each country, each nation, has its own contribution to make to the world polity. The city of Bangalore must not live for itself alone; it has a contribution to make to the State of Mysore; and Mysore has its obligations to India; and India has her mission to fulfil to the world at large.

India, as a State, as a great Kingdom, has a duty not only to herself, but to the world at large. India can and should learn from other lands, but she has her own Dharma towards all peoples and all countries. The U.S.A. can teach us some things about sanitation in every cottage, villa, or chateau. Britain can teach us the bulldog tenacity with which we can hold on and can warn us against the arrogance in which that country indulges; so France can teach us to uphold the ideal of the Rights of the Individual and warn us against the heat of emotions in which France spends so much of her force. And so can every country teach us, from Japan to Russia. But India, the *Alma Mater* of the world, the Mother of Cultures, has a mighty lesson to offer to our humanity. The Egypt of the great Alchemists is gone; the Chaldea of the great Astrologers is no more; China and Iran and Turkey are copying Westernized and martialized Japan, but India lives. For what? With what kind of life are her villages vitalized — misery, yes; poverty, yes; ignorance, yes; but the Soul of Spirituality is there.

Look at India: this vast territory has witnessed tremendous historical changes, as centuries have rolled on to become millennia; but tremendous as are the changes, they are but surface appearances, behind which there is

something eternal and changeless. Consider the most typical product of India: on this soil walks today, as he has walked in ages gone by, the *Sannyāsi*, the renouncer of the senses but the possessor of the Spirit, the Yogi who, throwing off the yoke of *Kāma, Krodha, Lobha,* has united himself with the Great Light. And what has inspired him thus to walk the Way of Divinity? The Power, the *Shakti,* of Mother India, as that Force vibrates in our Aryan *Ākāsha.*

Stretch your vision to the southern extremity of our dear land; who sits there? Kanya-Kumari, symbol of the virgin mind, ever young; of the virgin heart, ever creative. Then turn and look up to the northern heights; what do you see? Gauri Shankar, symbol of the Divine Love, essential for the building of the Home. Unite these two symbols — of the South, of the North — and read, reflect upon, and assimilate their sublime message. What is it? The creative Spirit of Virgin Purity has to be activated for the building of chaste and holy homes — homes without which there can be no Democracy at all, and sacred hearths without which there can be no Spiritual Democracy.

EDITOR

VALUE THEORY: EAST AND WEST

[READERS will remember **Mr. Arthur L. Herman's** long study, "Morality and Religion," which appeared in our pages last year (October-December 1963). We print below the first part of this long article, which explores the present state of the theory of value in the West. The second part, to appear next month, will turn to the Eastern *milieu*.—ED.]

I

> Conditioned anxiety (Hull), eating one's father (Freud), and the perceptual grouping of stars into constellations — these are the ways in which the major theories think of ethical values and their development. (BRANDT: *Ethical Theory*, p. 139)

ETHICAL THEORY in the West is either in a muddle or else many contrary ethical theories are equally true. That is, either ethical theory in the West is confused and inconsistent, or a broad relativism reigns over a discipline which at one time was remarkable for its singleness of purpose and its unity of theory.

We would like to argue in what follows that not only is ethical theory muddled and confused in the West, but value theory in general in the Occident, when examined, shows a serious lack of understanding as to just what value theory is about, what its aims and purposes are, and what are the best means of judging those ends as societies pursue them. With this confusion and muddle in the West, we should like to juxtapose an Eastern, particularly Hindu, theory of value which solves many of the problems currently in vogue among Western axiologists, and presents a reasonableness and consistency which, if examined, might be of interest to the Western philosopher. We believe that Western and Eastern value theory can be contrasted sharply, even if we have to "make-believe in order to understand," i.e., oversimplify where we should be splitting fine hairs, suspend disbelief where we should demand the strictest observations of the protocol of scholarly research. It will be helpful, in a preliminary undertaking such as this paper pretends to be, to lay on with the theory first and then worry about the niceties of that protocol at a later time.

Once the two theories, East and West, are exposed, there will be a temptation to judge which is the better. The confusion in even attempting such meta-meta-evaluations will be touched on later, but now let us merely state that such evaluation is far beyond the area of value theory as we understand that discipline, and the urge to yield to such temptations, now the rage, will not be indulged here.

The Western Milieu

Speaking with his usual *naiveté* about axiological philosophical matters,[1] David Hume said:

> Whatever is valuable in any kind, so naturally classes itself under the division of *useful* or *agreeable,* the *utile* or the *dulce,* that it is not easy to imagine why we should ever seek further, or consider the question as a matter of nice research or inquiry.

One does not have to attend a class in ethical theory to realize that it is quite easy to see, if not to imagine beforehand, that this simply will not do. Indeed, "seeking further" was the cornerstone of eighteenth-century philosophical and scientific method, and it has been the motto of the West ever since, where "progress is our most important product." Even if one could agree with Hume (and very few do that), that the "valuable" is "useful" or "agreeable," the further problem of agreeing on meanings for "useful" and "agreeable" is bound to come up. There is, therefore, nothing "natural" about Hume's classification, i.e., it is not intuitively obvious, nor is it generally accepted by most good men as an obvious subdivision of the "valuable." "Nice research" and "inquiry" for the modern philosopher rather begins with Hume than ends with Hume.[2]

The hodge-podge of value theories rife in the West at the present time is undoubtedly due to the nature of the study itself, particularly of the object of that study: "Moreover, value theory enjoys the unique importance of being the only subject whose object is the study of importance itself" (John R. Reid: *A Theory of Value,* p. v). Isolating and defining "importance" for the respective fields of value study (ethics, æsthetics, etc.) is only part of the game. We have yet to determine *what* values are specifically important to individuals or classes of persons, and then show scientifically how this importance is to be measured. The philosopher here is concerned with the meaning of "importance," and the psychologist-scientist is concerned with the measure of "importance" in human or

---

[1] This is a harsh description, and few philosophers will abide it, but it appears to us that the zenith of the Hume vogue is now long overdue. What he said in ethics was better said by Hutcheson, and perhaps with more rigor and precision. One can't give the usual apologetic for "good Davey" by using the "historical fallacy," as we might call it, i.e. of saying, "Well, you know he lived before the 20th century, so you can't expect him to be as sophisticated as we are about such things. How was he to know ?" It is false to assume nothing worth while happened in philosophy before 1900, or before David Hume, for that matter. I doubt that Hume would accept such apologies for his theories himself. But perhaps an even more dangerous fallacy in criticism itself, the "eager dog" fallacy is being used here by us.

[2] And philosophers ever since have had an axiology to grind. (We do not approve of punning generally, but to resist such obvious invitations as this, is neither wise nor right. Here we stand, we cannot do other.)

animal activity, though it is vastly more complex than this, particularly because "importance" or "value" is not the same thing for all men all the time, and particularly for the professional hunter of "values." This Herakleitean world is a real and oftentimes terrible arena for the professional. Not only must he contend with the vagaries of colleagues and other hunters in this jungle of axiology, but he himself as a continually growing and developing organism has values which are ceaselessly maturing and altering. One, indeed, cannot even step into the same jungle once, if one is, haplessly, an axiologist. It is not surprising that the non-specialist is confused when the philosophers themselves are confused.

One has only to review texts on ethics, or value theory in general for that matter, and note the welter of fine definitions for "importance" to realize how broad the disagreement is among the professionals. The pails of ink spilled over the defence of the "good" or "right" alone would shock even the most ardent casuistical pedant. The standard approach in such texts begins with a review of all previous value theories, with a systematic refutation of each theory as soon as its presentation is complete. Then follows the author's own theory which is, as often as not, (1) rehashed Plato or Aristotle; (2) some religious theory or cult fad, ancient or modern, axiologized for contemporary man; (3) a restatement of one or more of the theories just refuted by the author in the first part of his book (on a "new" approach to value theory); or (4) a potpourri of all the above, resulting in an "all new" synthesis.

The approach we shall take is to merely restate a few of these theories current in the West today, leaving it to the reader to draw his own conclusions concerning the state of the value *milieu* in the West. Dearth of agreement and multiplicity of theory to counter theory may be a sign of a growing discipline; or it may be the sign of a vain eristic given over to mere fine distinctions rather than to valuable suggestions. Periodically, value theory is revived and important work is done, but inevitably, after the dust settles, the same old questions are asked and re-asked, and the same answers are painted up and trotted out for another showing. Thus Naturalism, Supernaturalism, Non-naturalism, and Non-cognitivism are old and new bottles for old and new wines, in so far as old wines go into old or new bottles, and new wines go into old bottles, but new wines do not go into new bottles, i.e., *really* "new" value theories (confine the discussion to only ethical theory now) just do not occur. For example, if the four above types of ethical disciplines are the bottles (with Non-cognitivism representing about as "new" and different a discipline as one is likely to find nowadays), the types of wine or meta-ethical theories for those bottles might be the following: mentalism, realism, objectivism, subjectivism, relativism, and absolutism. None of these meta-ethical theories can be

defended conclusively against the charges of the others.[3] None of these meta-ethical theories is more recent than Aristotle, and while this is not a mark against them, it does seem that sooner or later the arguments for and against this list of meta-ethical theories (which list is exhaustive, it can be argued), or for and against any combination of meta-ethical theories in this list, must soon be depleted, or else one must go out to the extreme of splitting many fine conceptual hairs in a vain attempt to put the arguments in a new and informative manner. Disciplines which have reached this stage of non-development are usually relegated to a part of that study called "History." It might well be that ethical theory will soon be interesting and informative, but only as a history, and ethics as a study will be taught in curriculae dealing merely with the history of ideas.

If ethical theory *per se* does come to such a point (and perhaps it is taught from this point of view even now), it will be well to remind ourselves that the growing end of value theory shows no such signs of atrophying and turning into past history.

Briefly recapitulating, one is vaguely dissatisfied with ethical theory as it stands today. The sheer weight of contrary (and contradictory) theories describing "importance" in ethical theory (its meaning, its application, its wanton ways, its "value" for modern man, its lack of value for modern man, etc. etc., theories which in themselves can never be anything more than philosopher B's mere preference for Naturalism and philosopher A's mere preference for Non-naturalism, sheer autobiography in a sense, based on temperament, as James would say) cannot help but give us pause to wonder if there is not something basically wrong with ethical theory itself; that somewhere deep in the bowels of that discipline, or in the discipline of value theory *per se*, there is a mistake. Perhaps someone asked the wrong question to begin with, or maybe this is not the kind of discipline that can yield the sort of answer that ultra-consistency-minded philosophers are looking for. We realize there has been a vogue in the West since 1936 for making value theory the whipping boy for the philosophy of science, and when something went wrong in the latter theory, it was immediately assumed that value judgements were responsible and the "damned old values" were again sent to the corner. As we see it, this attitude has merely given rise to "just another" theory of ethics; thus it has not helped to clear away the welter of theories to add yet another theory, "Non-cognitivism" as it was called, to the brands already here. We would welcome such a "new" wine, naturally; it is perhaps the first interesting and informative theory of this century; but it has not dispelled the confusion, but

[3] Witness the attempts and skirmishes over attempts in modern ethical theory from which no final and satisfying ("interesting" criteria ?) conclusions have yet been found, to which all might agree (interesting, also, as a criterion).

only increased it.

One of the more important beginnings to clear the air in this muddled study of value is a book edited by Ray Lepley called *Value: A Co-operative Inquiry*. This book is an attempt to answer four fundamental questions raised by John Dewey in an article in *The Journal of Philosophy*,[4] published five years before the book. The method of this book is to call in a number of qualified persons interested in value theory and get them to attempt answers to the questions and then comment on each other's answers. The questions are:

> I. What is the connection between prizing and desiring, liking, interest, enjoying, etc.?
>
> II. Is one of the above a sufficient condition for value?
>
> III. What are value propositions like? Characteristics?
>
> IV. Can scientific method be applicable to judgments or propositions of value? Or does value by its nature preclude scientific methods of inquiry? (*Value*, p. 5).

It does seem to us that no ethical theory can be a real theory of value unless it at least answers these questions in some sense. By far the most important question here is IV, where the issue of the attachment of scientific method to value theory is raised. It does seem to us that questions I–III are old questions which involve the use of definitions, the whims of philosophers, the temperaments of bibliophiles, the predilections of men conditioned by their times, where what's true in 1936 is no longer true in 1956 (the year A. J. AYER's *The Problem of Knowledge* was published). This is rationalism in the old sense of the word, grounded in impressions, feelings for words, or popular usage and the like. Thus, questions I and II are concerned with how someone feels or thinks, i.e., how Oxonians or Cantabridgians really mean to use their language. Question III could be of the same order if one were merely rationalistic (intuitive) about the undertaking. Thus Anscombe (*Intentions*), Hare (*Language of Morals*), and Toulmin (*The Place of Reason in Ethics*) ask about value propositions and value terms within the arena of ethical theory, but their results, based on no more than intuitive feeling for terms and propositions of an ethical sort, fall into one or the other of the older theories classed as new and old wines, previously, in this paper. However, if scientific method were applied to these first three questions, it does seem to us that ethics and value theory could possibly be revitalized (for a time at least). Dewey's attitude,[5] in the Lepley volume, seems to be one of finding answers to the

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[4,5] John Dewey, "Some Questions About Value" in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XLI. pp. 449-455. The fact that five years (1944-49) passed between the time of the publishing of the article and the appearance of the book, *Value: A Cooperative Inquiry* (hereafter, "*Value*"), (I haven't been able to find any significant reply to Dewey's 1944 article in *J.P.* after 1944.)

first three questions through the behavioural sciences, i.e., by admitting that question IV must be answered first. There is then, a whole shift in the area of meaning in ethical theory when the notion of behaviour, "preferential behaviour," is used to designate value. Here is a new opening for ethical theory in combination, possibly, with anthropology, history, and the behavioural sciences. It might be that muddles in value theory can be resolved for a time, once philosophy can break through the magic circle of rationalism, intuitionism, and I-have-a-feeling-we-mean-this kind of philosophizing.[6] The enchantment has held an important discipline in thrall for many years; it is about time that Prince Charming showed up.

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

(*To be concluded*)

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is itself an interesting comment on Western value theory. Of course, everyone was off fighting a war for two of those years, and then readjustment probably took a while (philosophers are notoriously slow adaptors), then the general unsettledness following readjustment, etc., etc., until finally in 1948-49, someone read one of the old back issues of *J.P.* and then Lepley's book. The fact that Dewey goes nearer to the heart of the matter, and consequently closer to the whole general ailment, may be unsettling to most philosophers who don't wish to end controversy (a noble enough ideal), but to prolong it.

[6] "A scientific axiology will have as its task the development of a verified theory of preferential behaviour. It will not merely describe what organisms prefer what things under what conditions, but through observation and experimentation attempt to formulate the underlying laws of such behaviour. Axiology so conceived is a part of behaviouristics, namely, that part concerned with preferential behaviour."—CHARLES W. MORRIS: *Axiology as the Science of Preferential Behaviour*, p. 212. Morris once said, "...ideals are ideas clothed with preference," which seemed a cogent paraphrase of his whole philosophy following his semiotic. What Dewey hath proposed, Morris hath disposed. We are suggesting here, in this paper, that this is one way out of the muddle for Western axiologists.

SCIENCE AND SPIRITUALITY

[Our old and esteemed friend, **Shrimati Lila Ray,** reflects that science and spirituality are both about Reality, and Reality is one. Hence the researches of science, ought, as it were, to provide a continually wider scope in which the Spirit of man may express itself. Indeed, the spiritual life is a synthesis of science, i.e., knowing; religion, i.e., feeling and inner attitude; and philosophy, i.e., reflection on one's experiences.—Ed.]

Life is process, movement. The absence of movement denotes the absence of life.

Living substance is the same as lifeless substance. The organic and the inorganic worlds are built of the same matter. This primal substance, the ground of all existence, has been given many names and spoken of in many contexts, both scientific and religious. Boehme called it the *Ungrund.*

Living substance evolves out of the non-living, mysteriously obeying the same general rules. The discovery and codification of these rules is the task that science has taken upon itself. It searches systematically for typical and recurring forms of life in which the ineffable *Ungrund* manifests itself. It detects the exception, the aberration that gives rise to mutation. It is through the successful mutation that the self-transforming advance of evolution is made possible. The evolutionary process is constantly generating new patterns and novel qualities, building its future by transcending its past. It is as process that we must regard life.

The living and the non-living are activated by the same energy. In the first the action is inward, giving rise to movement that appears to be self-generated and self-directed. Energy works upon non-living, inorganic substance from without, by external application.

The polarity of this dual inward and outward movement is the basic phenomenon of existence. It is through it that the great life force gives form to chaos. The creative projection of the *Ungrund* must be accepted as the reality of life. Its inner and outer streams unite the psychical and physiological aspects of the evolutionary process.

All movement is determined by this polarity, from the alternate expansion and contraction of the heart which enables it to beat, the alternate contraction and expansion of the lungs which enables us to breathe, to the psychic contraction that enables man to develop as an individual and realize himself in the creation of a personality and the expansion of the psyche which enables him to identify himself with the general stream of evolution and continue its advance. It includes immanence and transcendence.

Human history and human destiny are thus seen to be part of a larger process, an all-inclusive unitary unfoldment, in which advance is more

important than survival, the history of life itself. Man's interests are an integral part of this development and his beliefs are tools which assist him in maintaining his evolutionary position. By self-induced and conscious variation he transcends himself and assures continuity by reproducing his own kind. What are *postulates* to the religious are *facts* to the scientific. Some of these are: (1) that the cosmos and man obey the same laws; (2) that man is not divided from the cosmos by any fixed limits; (3) that a way leads from the one to the other and communication between them, known and unknown, is constant; (4) that man participates by nature in all cosmic events and is inwardly and outwardly interwoven with them; and (5) that the psyche and the cosmos are related to each other as the inner and outer workings of the energy which activates the *Ungrund*.

Science does not see this energy itself. It is invisible and intangible. The effects of it alone betray its presence. In its passage it leaves behind it, like footprints, the many forms it creates. Science follows it, mapping its course. Science observes, notes down, and puts in order the facts that it is able to discover about the workings of this creative energy in the universe as a whole, including man. This great vital force flows, much as water flows, focusing first in one form of life and then another, continually experimenting with new combinations and shapes, discarding the inadequate and perfecting the adequate. Adequacy and inadequacy are determined by efficiency in living and skill in survival.

Science devotes itself to the acquisition and organization of knowledge. The utilization of it, the fathoming of its meaning, is an inward activity that belongs to the realm of the spirit. The object of spiritual discipline is the utilization of experience and knowledge in a manner that reduces the amount of frustration and increases the amount of fulfilment.

If science must turn to the spirit for the meaning of life and the interpretation of the facts it collects, the spirit must lean on science as its guide in the world of reality. Without science we could not comprehend the world around us at all, nor exercise any control over it. Without spirit we would have no knowledge of or control over our own natures. Human development can be kept open for the realization of ever newer possibilities only by the knowledge placed at our disposal by science used intelligently and with full control by the spirit. Without the aid of science the spirit is easily imprisoned by the closed doors of dogma. No action is higher or more noble than the raising of the inherent possibilities of life. It means, for us, the full utilization of man's potential powers.

The spirit is the intelligent, immaterial part of man, the force that governs vital phenomena. The spiritual and the scientific are parallel in their working to the inward and outward workings of the primal energy.

The German poet, Goethe, transformed the spiritual philosophy of his day by developing his morphology on the basis of existing natural sciences. With the aid of the concepts he arrived at as a scientist, he gave to spiritual theosophy a lucid form and made it acceptable to the modern mind. There is not and cannot be any conflict between science and spirituality if either of them is rightly understood. Goethe wrote:

> Light and spirit, the one governing the physical, the other the ethical realm, are the highest indivisible energies of which we are able to think.

Both emanate from the same cosmic ground.

Science is a religion of reverence. Awe deepens as more and more wonders are revealed all around, within and without us. It is deeply spiritual in the Indian sense, in that no living creature is excluded and even the non-living is accorded its place as a vital link in the great cyclic exchanges of matter and energy constantly going on in the cosmos. In India scientific disciplines are recognized as a valid way of achieving the ultimate enlightenment under the name *Jñāna Mārga,* the Way of Knowledge.

In extending man's awareness through accurate factual knowledge and thus enhancing and intensifying his perceptions science serves the human spirit no less than philosophy as thought of by Walter Pater. It rouses it, startling it into a life of constant and eager observation. Every moment some form grows perfect and we fulfil ourselves in noting its perfection and watching it develop and fade.

Man thus participates more and more extensively and harmoniously and deeply in the inward flow of the psyche and is drawn on to greater activity and sensitivity. This feeling of inner movement is a feeling of meaningful life welling up in the individual. With heightened momentum it becomes concrete experience and man gains access to the larger sources of life-energy, both conscious and unconscious.

LILA RAY

> Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is.
>
> —I. JOHN

AWAKENING

[**H. H. Shri Natwarsinhji** of Porbandar, an esteemed friend, wrote last in our pages on "Music, Indian and Western" (October 1958). He has for long let his mind dwell in philosophical reflections and has published some philosophical aphorisms of his own. In this article he reflects, unacademically and out of the resources of his own thought, on the concepts of time, continuity, and immortality.—ED.]

IT IS OFTEN SAID that the world, or all Creation for that matter, is an illusion. Is it, or is it not?

One thing is certain, however, as a first step in contemplation, that whatever has "form" is transient and transitory, and has therefore to come to an end. In that sense it can be regarded as not real — unreal. In simple words, it can further be said that whatever is not real is illusory, and therefore an illusion. To terminate this argument so lightly, however, would not be, and should not be, convincing.

In proceeding to the next step, we could accept as a fact that "life" constitutes a progression of "repetitions." The functions of our hearts and our lungs, which, to us, are involuntary, constitute repetitions of the beat and the inhalation and exhalation. Similarly, all our voluntary daily activities too repeat day after day to compose life, "a life." Seen conversely, therefore, a life would be but a certain number of repetitions of a year, and a year, twelve repetitions of a month; a month, thirty repetitions of a day; a day, twenty-four repetitions of an hour, and so on down to the smallest measurable length of Time, which could be so reduced to a minute quantum of it as to be immeasurable by any invented instrument of science. Even then it would continue to exist by virtue of its sheer indestructibility. Time is existence itself, and that there could be such a thing as existencelessness does not fall within the range of human intelligence to comprehend. Time, even to its minutest fraction, could be nothing but eternal, and every-"thing" and every-"one" lives in its eternity. The utmost that could happen to anything material is transubstantiation — changing from one substance to another. But as "Spirit" or soul is formless and hence is a substanceless substance in itself, it is bound to continue as it is and cannot possibly undergo the process of transubstantiation. Like Time and Space, Spirit or Soul must be all-pervading too. They may all be one — who knows? (That quantum of the Universal Spirit which is encased in any being of the flora and fauna, I regard as the Soul.)

"A life" is a quantum or unit of Time. Would it then not stand to simple acceptable reason to say that it must be a unit of time telescoped progressionally into innumerable other such units, just as the seconds are in minutes, minutes in hours, hours in days, days in weeks, weeks in months,

months in years, and years in decades and centuries and millennia?

How can it then be believed, as some or many do, that there is no continuity of life after the body dies? When, in a clock, the hour of "one" dies as its fifty-ninth minute comes to an end, the clock itself does not die but continues, and the hour of "two" comes into being and replaces it — a repetition or a reincarnation of the hour of "one," except that the man-made occurrences in the second may not be identical with those of the first, although the natural occurrences within the man, as the beat of the heart or the functioning of the lungs and the circulation of blood, would continue identically.

A flower withers and dies, but it leaves the seed to propagate itself again, and again, and again, until, by some law of creation and destruction, the seed itself is deprived of the power of propagation — a power, though, that lies not in the control of the seed itself.

It may however be argued that the seed is a tangible substance and that its alternating continuity as flower and seed cannot therefore be equated with that of intangible life and death.

Just as the seed is the "cause" of the "caused" flower, the soul is the cause of life; and as there can be no death without life, life itself assumes the role of the cause of death. If this is so, and it is, then it would stand just as much to reason to assume and believe that death would itself become the cause of life — another life — in the rotation of their alternating existence, even as the conclusion of a day ushers in the night and that of the night the day.

To continue the discussion in support of the mutually aided and combined continuity of life and death, a line would illustrate it further. Now, the length of a line must lie between its two ends; but it would be wrong to call the two ends the two ends, because, as nothing can have even one end without a beginning, nothing could possibly have two ends without a beginning at all. One of them would have to be the beginning, and the other the end. Which is which would be the silencing question. There is no answer to give, except (a) that either extremity could be the beginning or the end; and (b) that if both the ends were to be turned and joined together, it would not be possible to discern them, much less to distinguish one from the other and say which was which.

Birth and death would likewise be no different from each other. They would be one. Not only that, but (a) as birth and death represent the two extremities of life and culminate in two points as do the two of a line; and (b) as a point is dimensionless and has no length or breadth, neither birth nor death would have any dimensional duration of their own at all, and therefore (c) it could be accepted without doubt that nothing can obstruct them from merging into one and then being a mere condition

within a continuous whole, just as any point on a line would be if the line were bent and its ends were joined together into a wheel of ceaseless continuity.

Reverting to the thought of "illusion," the aspect of "the point" in relation to a line is worthy of note. The latest scientific definition of a line is that it is something which is created by the movement of a point between two given points. This, in other words, means that a line has no length of its own; and that, therefore, constituted as it is of a sequential motion of one and the same point, which has no breadth, what appears to us as a line, does not, in reality, exist at all. It is unreal, and is just as much "nothing" as the point of which it is composed, and hence an illusion. In the same way, if we were to regard "life" as a line between the two given points of birth and death which have already been discussed as being void of any duration of their own — life would likewise be durationless, non-existent, an illusion: and so would the whole apparent mundane creation therefore be. It would just be a great incomprehensible, unfathomable "nothingness," yet one from which everything mundane and abstract is derived: everything in nothing, and nothing in everything: *Maya.*

The philosophy of the dream-state would also have a bearing on the subjects under discussion.

None regard the dream as a state of reality, although, while in that condition, none take it as unreal. Only when we awake into the real state do we realize that the other was unreal.

There is also the other strange condition of the "daydream." Therein we unconsciously drift into a scene other than the one we are actually in, and thus become absolutely oblivious of our waking-state as well as of our immediate surroundings; and this happens frequently to us all in any occupation of life. Were we therefore to (a) total as "dream state" all those hours during which we are not conscious of ourselves owing to our being aware of anything but ourselves, and (b) regard the waking state as being only that period during which we are fully aware that we are conscious of ourselves, the total number of hours which we might discover to have been spent in oblivion would perhaps astonish us.

Taking all the preceding factors into consideration, and specially those of (a) man's capacity in the dream state to believe that that state is real; (b) his capacity to daydream in the waking state, but his incapacity to be concentratedly aware of himself for any appreciable length of time at a stretch; and, above all, (c) Nature's law of continuity, is it an absolute impossibility that, when man passes out of one state of life into another, he may fail to realize that the newer one is the real waking state and not the one he had earlier experienced, which was but a dream and an illusion?

This continuity of life after life (even as that of year after year, month after month, day after day, hour after hour, minute after minute, second after second, and then the diminishing fractional second merging into timeless eternity), might continue ceaselessly until the maximum span of "the larger life" of a particular soul is terminated by its Creator and it is brought back to him, just as a goldsmith might take back an article of precious metal, which has outlived its utility, to re-melt and re-make it into a new article.

In bringing all the foregoing thoughts to an apex, it cannot be refuted that what has been described as unreal would nevertheless have a kind of reality of its own, in that, for example, as a dream is "something," it is undeniably real, but only to the extent of that "something," whatever that "something" may be. Only our thinking makes us regard it as unreal in relation to the other supplementary and complementary conditions of life which we call, and believe to be, "real" — the waking state. It is entirely owing to the relation of the one to the other that we take and accept the one as real and the other as not.

This is "relativity," or call it "duality"; and it is under this law that our world and the universe are created and clearly operated.

It could therefore be said, and perhaps unchallengeably too, that reality and unreality are constant companions, that they subsist together, and that there is much of each in the other; as there are as many hours of dark in the bright half of the moon as of moonlight in the dark half. Only, we have named these two phases of the moon as the bright and the dark half. In actuality, there is no difference between them except that we call one the dark half because we are asleep and not awake to see the moon shed its lustre on the earth, and we call the other the bright half because we are then still awake to see it after the moon has risen. In fact, therefore, this nomenclature of the bright and the dark half is entirely the product of our half-awakeness to, and thereby the half-knowledge of, actuality from time to time; but it is a fitting case in instance to substantiate in fairly practical terms the theories of relativity and duality. It should further substantiate that unless we are fullly awake to realities, it is not possible for us to transcend duality and enter the domain of individuality. This, in relation to spiritual enlightenment, which man could strive for, would mean that he who has attained individuality by shedding the misguiding *Maya* and its bonds of duality, would also win the ability to reach this enlightenment.

Would the attainment of such an individuality be of much practical help to humanity in its routine worldly affairs? Certainly it would, for, it would be he, once again, who has progressed more towards individuality who would be more able to avoid being led by others' judgement and

advice, and would thus be better equipped to perceive the pros and cons of duality's operation in mundane facts than another in whom the qualities of individuality have not developed to the same extent. He would have a more extensive capacity for assessment and a deeper sense of justice, and would hence have the greater moral strength of the two to fight injustice in its many manifestations. The world could never have a surfeit of just individuals: and many more men could be justly individualistic were they only to urge themselves out of their usual groove and come into the open to receive awakening, which, Nature, through the functioning of its diverse laws, mundane and abstract, is ever ready to pour into him who is ready to receive it.

H. H. NATWARSINHJI OF PORBANDAR

YOUR FOOTPRINTS

In Memory of Prime Minister Nehru

Your footprints mark the changing face of the world —
The teeming clod hove up — became a man —
Then Freedom's bloodied banner was unfurled
And centuries were leapt in an hour's span.

But you would walk the ways of peace, alone;
Through the long waiting years you gave your own
Freedom, your dearest ones, that India might
Through God-like sacrifice evoke the light.

You ringed the earth with light. When you passed by
The downcast eye looked up that hope might quicken
The heart of the despoiled — his patch of sky
Opened into the bright expanse of heaven.
Your heart was the broad highway where all could meet.
As brothers. Your mind was reason's high retreat.

DOROTHY ELLIN FLAX

BROWNING FOR TODAY

[**Miss Dallas Kenmare** is a writer well known in both the U.S.A. and Great Britain, especially for literary criticism. *The Times Literary Supplement* has said of her that she writes "with spiritual insight and faith in the creative goodness of life." She has devoted more than one study to Robert Browning, including her recent book *An End to Darkness* (1962). In 1962 she gave the Robert Browning Memorial Address in Westminster Abbey. Her article blends close knowledge of Browning with clearness of mind and a cheerful vigour of conviction.—Ed.]

"The Victorians are out-of-date"; "the Romantics are escapists"; neither can possibly be in touch with contemporary problems, we are told, so — quite logically, of course — the moderns decline to spend time reading them, or even thinking of their existence. Browning has been readily dismissed by one of the younger school of critics as "not a poet at all," and as for the Romantics — well, nearly thirty years ago Herbert Read wrote a book "in defence of Shelley"; so what now, when the age of Freud and Marx and nuclear weapons has reduced us to the "realism" of the dustbin?

Before going any further, however, we might profitably consider a definition of this favoured word "realism." So far as I can discover, it has nothing to do with the many unsavoury aspects of life which usually come into this category, but is really concerned with "fidelity of representation." Now it cannot possibly be argued that ugliness, vice, squalor, and so on are more true to life, in other words offer a more complete "fidelity of representation," than those opposites — beauty, virtue, seemliness — which are at present so unpopular. The prevailing cult of ugliness in all its forms is no more realistic in the proper sense than the derided "lilies and languors" of the 'nineties. "Life," clearly, is all-inclusive, and those who stress one aspect only are certainly not realists. And — just by the way — when so much ugliness, vice, and squalor is offered to the public under the guise of realism, why is anyone surprised at the increase in crime, and falling standards generally?

But to return to the Victorians, and in particular to one of the greatest of them, Robert Browning, who was pre-eminently a realist, in the true sense of the word, and whose preoccupations were very considerably concerned with, of all unlikely subjects for a poet, criminal psychology, leading eventually to the writing of *The Ring and the Book,* where he explored, as no poet other than Shakespeare has done, so exhaustively the depth of depravity lurking in the nature of man. Though he saw all with the eye of compassion, he made no attempt to minimize or in any way justify — far from it — the evils he revealed so startlingly. Certainly the tragedy of Pompilia is a monstrous example of the martyrdom of the innocent, a

mystery of good and evil so appalling and perplexing that even the divinely inspired mind of the Pope was shaken by it, and he pondered:

> . . . . as we see and speak,
> A faultless creature is destroyed, and sin
> Has had its way i' the world where God should rule,
> . . . . Beyond this tale, I reach into the dark.

The Ring and the Book is indeed an epic drama of good and evil, where, however, Browning's main concern is to reveal the *good in evil,* the mysterious ways of God with man, so that in the end the almost totally evil Guido Franceschini cries:

> Sirs, my first true word, all truth and no lie,
> Is — save me notwithstanding! Life is all!
> I was just stark mad, — let the madman live
> Pressed by as many chains as you please pile!

Confronted with imminent death, he speaks truth at last, and realizes the value of life, the great gift so often spurned: "Life is all!" he cries, and his last word, after calling on "Christ, — Maria, — God!" is to Pompilia, his child-wife whose murder he had contrived: "Pompilia, will you let them murder me?"

During this last year especially, events in England, and indeed throughout the world, have been of so outrageous and profoundly shocking a nature that our minds have been drawn towards the most sordid and horrible aspects of human nature, and for a deeper understanding, a more comprehensive and inclusive view of these appalling evidences of evil we might well turn to *The Ring and the Book,* which G. K. Chesterton reminded us was written around "a sordid police-case." We are in constant, and indeed desperate, need of the wisdom of the poets to maintain not only a balance, but to be able in Caponsacchi's words:

> To have to do with nothing but the true,
> The good, the eternal — and these, not alone
> In the main current of the general life,
> But in small experiences of every day. . . .
> To learn not only by a comet's rush
> But a rose's birth. . . .

Speaking personally, I can scarcely imagine how life today could be lived at all without the help of the poets, when the day-to-day surface-view of events assaulting our eyes and ears through the newspapers, radio, and television is altogether too devastating. Only art — genuine art, not the many pseudo forms thrust continually upon our notice — has the power to help us to see more deeply, to realize that life has an immense signifi-

cance, an unpopular view with the contemporary dramatists and novelists of nihilism and triviality, whose "philosophy" might be summed up in such brief questions and answers as: "Where are we going?" "Nowhere"; and "To what purpose, anyway?" "None." We shall never survive unless we come to believe the words of Browning's Fra Lippo Lippi. "[Life] means intensely, and means good."

In this fantastic period through which we are living we tend to be obsessed with the problem of evil, and no wonder. But it is essential to maintain a sense of proportion, and to realize that we can never come anywhere near even an approximate understanding of this baffling problem unless we realize that, as Browning wrote in "Pauline," it relates, in its entirety, to "some state of life unknown." The true meaning of good and evil is clearly beyond our present understanding, and the "answer" lies in the eternal dimension, not on this twilit earth. We always, and quite naturally, attempt to interpret ultimate eternal problems in temporal terms, and because the world as we know it, the world of humanity, is so dusky and dim, we cannot hope to see clearly or straight, in fact we really see "upside-down" or "back-to-front," as if we lived in a world of distorting mirrors, or in a looking-glass world, and it is essential to reverse our thinking and seeing before we can hope to acquire a glimmer of true understanding. Browning wrote in *The Ring and the Book*:

> Our human speech is naught,
> Our human testimony false, our fame
> And human estimation words and wind.

What we may call "soul-sight" is the only true vision, but how difficult that sight is to maintain when the outward appearances, interpreted by the mind and its hordes of interrupting thoughts, always, insistently distort the vision.

Browning wrote words of profound solace in "Abt Vogler" when he said that:

> The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound,

and

> What was good, shall be good, with, for evil, so much more.

But what did he mean exactly by saying that "The evil is null, is nought," when it seems to us, especially in this tragic century, that evil is far from being "nought"? Is evil really a "nothing," as many philosophies affirm? Is it perhaps that when Browning, in "The Guardian Angel" wrote "O, world, as God has made it! all is beauty," he was stating the truth, and if *all* is beauty (which looks, I admit, unlikely!) and beauty as Keats said, is truth, then obviously evil must be, to a final understanding, unreal; the

shadow cast by the great sunlight of Truth, and we know too well the more brilliant the sunlight, the deeper the shadow, which is the sense in which good so often evokes evil. We have no stranger example of this than the fact that the perfect goodness of Christ evoked in men the sin which led to the Crucifixion. Yet writing of evil, in "Bishop Blougram's Apology," Browning calls it "the blessed Evil," because it is designed to hide God from our sight until we can bear the stress of the vision. Similarly he suggests that the element of falsehood in truth, the impossibility of uncovering the naked truth itself, is designed to shield us from the blinding light in quintessence: "It were the seeing Him, no flesh can dare," seeing God, the Truth.... What is the real meaning of the strange fact that there can be no shadow without sunlight? Does good in some mysterious way *create* evil? Or at all events disturb the hidden forces which produce evil and bring them into play? It seems the final answer is not "here," and perhaps we only plague ourselves with the unanswerable questions — which Buddha enjoined us to leave alone. Meanwhile, we see what we can, "through a glass darkly," but such poets as Browning help to clear much of the obscurity.

Browning, of course, would have pondered long and penetratingly on the preposterous situation to which contemporary man has brought himself, and he would have had few illusions as to the cause, for he, as everyone who knows anything at all about him is well aware, was pre-eminently the poet of the human soul — did he not write in the Dedication to "Sordello" the now famous words: "My stress lay on the incidents in the development of a soul: little else is worth study"? So we realize at once what he would have thought of an age which has come to question even the existence of such a "thing" as the soul. However, as a very recent and greatly prized philosopher, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, reminds us in *The Phenomenon of Man,* science regards man as "an animal," and it is precisely this neglect which has brought a science-worshipping age into its present disastrous dilemma. And this is where the great poets come in, since they deal with that dimension of the universe, that de Chardin calls "the within," which science completely overlooks, except of course in the branch of psychology, which, however, although it is concerned with the mind and "the unconscious" (whatever that may be — and even Jung, the great master, admits that it lies beyond definition) is, in its Freudian aspects at all events, a materialistic approach to the profound mystery which is man, Man whom de Chardin describes as "the most mysterious of all the objects met with by science." We may mention in passing that even if science declines to admit the existence of the soul, or attempts to explain it, if it does exist, as a part (undiscovered) of the brain, there remains always the incalculable element, the fact that man, as wholly

distinct from the animal creation, is given the power of *reflection,* not only for knowing — for many animals virtually *know* — in an instinctive sense, but of knowing what we know, reflecting on the knowledge, and from our reflections making deductions. Hence the human brain is quite distinct from the brain of an animal.

"Who tells of tracks to source the fount of Soul?" Browning asks in "Fifine at the Fair." Certainly not the scientists, whom D. H. Lawrence, and Blake before him, rightly dreaded. Yet clearly, if we really desire a properly workable human state, a tolerable, indeed enjoyable, condition of man, the true answer to the problem of what now seems an antinomy, between poetry and science, between science and religion, there must be a synthesis, each branch of knowledge acquiring the enlightenment, grace, and generosity to admit the claims and aspects of truth advanced by the other. If science can attain to this enlightenment in time to serve the cause of life, not death (for at present it too often happens that the life-sciences all too easily change into a means of death), the fearful age of transition we are now living through may well usher in a new era, undreamed-of in its possibilities for human advancement and happiness. So long as knowledge for its own sake is honoured there is little hope. In Browning's words in "Saul": "Have I knowledge? Confounded it shrivels at Wisdom laid bare." Knowledge without wisdom is the clue to our downfall. It can scarcely even be argued that knowledge by itself has really enriched life; clearly it could and would have done, if it had gone hand in hand with the wisdom which breeds the "reverence for life" on which Albert Schweitzer has based his whole life-philosophy. But as things are, knowledge, divorced from wisdom, has brought us to the brink of total annihilation.

Yet we live in such a miraculous world, a world — as the great poets have always known and declared — to be cherished and adored; and it is a tragedy, no less, that so few inhabitants of our wonderful planet seem to realize this and value their incomparable life on it. For life indeed is incomparable, and every human being a miracle; if only the Doors of Perception could be cleansed, and true vision attained. Meanwhile, life as commonly lived seems to be little better than a sleep-walking, or the stumbling progress of a blind man. Yet "God has prepared for those who love Him such good things as pass man's understanding."

Yes, *such good things.* Why not hold out our hands to receive the proffered gifts? We stand now at the most dramatic turning-point in the whole history of man. Is it to be life or death, salvation or annihilation? If it is to be life, if it is to be salvation, then it is obvious now that only the greatest spiritual revolution ever known can bring it about. And this is where the poets will help, strange though such an idea may seem to

many people, those who have no real knowledge of *what poetry is*. Poets, Browning said, "God ever meant should save the world." Save the world! What a tremendous claim! And they have never been given the chance. Indeed there is enough concentrated wisdom in one page of the poetry of Browning or Shelley instantly to save the world from the destruction threatening it, but — and here is the crux — the wisdom cannot remain on paper, it must be *applied*, and here as always, the choice lies with the individual, in the great gift of free-will. And it is hard, very hard, in the world as man, not God, has made it to live the wisdom poetry reveals. But now we have come so near the brink, and the evils and perils of our age are so extreme, that only extreme uncompromising methods can possibly hope to overthrow them. There can be no weak condoning of life-denying vice — for all vice, and especially sexual vice, is a sin against the great creative principle which is Life. Psychology has certainly taught us to look deeper in dealing with crime, but unhappily the lesson has not been rightly learned, with the result that the true nature of sin is now too readily dismissed as "human weakness" in need of psychological treatment, and though we perhaps realize better than we used to that "to know all is to forgive all," yet it is commonly overlooked that forgiveness is by no means condonation.

In a world of confused values, where only the strongest may hope to survive the insistent pressures, it would seem obvious that succour would lie in returning to the poets whom most people abandoned with their school-years; for in poetry we find the eternal values, the unchanging truths distilled in a magical perfection of language, the only language indeed during earthly life. There is no danger that poetry will take us away from "life, the mere living," from the day-to-day living which the triviality-writers stress as so important, for no matter how trivial the external events, how apparently meaningless and often boring and distasteful, the "under-surface" life, the life of human emotion in all its multitudinous forms, and of the mind, and — yes indeed — of the soul and the spirit, goes endlessly, inevitably on, from the first moment of the dawning of consciousness until the moment of death, and this life is never trivial, never boring, though often it may be tragic and infinitely sorrowful. But meaningless it can never be, and poetry, concerned pre-eminently with these great values, helps to maintain the sense of purpose in living without which the earthly pilgrimage is certainly little more than a "tale told by an idiot," "full of sound" certainly in these days when the benediction of silence is hardly ever allowed to descend, but for the most part too dreary to express the positive qualities of "fury."

Poets, concerned with *roots* and *causes*, not with the appearances which commonly pass for reality, are therefore comparatively unmoved by tem-

poral events no matter how outrageous. Even the horrors of our present atomic age would scarcely have surprised Browning, for he knew well that there are no limits to man's infinite capacity for uncovering Nature's secrets and using them for his own, too often base, purposes. He had studied so deeply the art of the alchemists and the philosophy of Paracelsus that he would have been no more surprised than Goethe, whose lifelong study of similar themes engaged him throughout the writing of *Faust*. And both had plumbed the depths of evil, manifested today in the many "fiend-voices that rave" and assault our defenceless ears at every turn. There is no substance in the generally accepted conception of Browning as an inveterate "optimist," for a close study of his work (which the theorists have not engaged in) reveals him as by no means an optimist, but conversely a realist who consistently "saw life steadily and saw it whole." In a letter to Julia Wedgwood he wrote of the "rare flashes of momentary conviction that come and go in the habitual dusk and doubt of one's life"—hardly the utterance of an "optimist." He believed that life on earth is a preparation for some other state beyond our present understanding, believed passionately in the value of the human soul and its limitless potentialities for growth, in the power of love to foster such growth, and in the pre-eminent need for courage in the battle which such developments inevitably produce. And whether such a *Lebensanschauung* is to be classed as "optimistic" seems irrelevant; for who with any knowledge of a great poet would attempt to confine him within such comparatively superficial limits? It is for Life itself, life in all its innumerable and infinitely varied and various manifestations, that such a poet as Browning speaks, and speaks for all time, not only for today.

DALLAS KENMARE

What I aspired to be,
And was not, comforts me.
—ROBERT BROWNING

DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM

A PATTERN FOR INDIA'S DEVELOPMENT

[**Shri C. V. H. Rao** is a civil servant of some experience and keenly interested in contemporary problems. He outlines an interpretation of "democratic socialism" as a middle way between irresponsible private capitalism and extremist Marxist-totalitarian Statism. Real socialism is concerned with much more than means of production or distribution of incomes: it is the embodying in political institutions of the ideal of Universal Brotherhood — which is far from a violent, fratricidal struggle between classes.—Ed.]

The Constitution of India has defined the social and economic goals of national policy in considerable detail. During the last few years we have been making progressive advances towards the realization of the goals of social and economic justice. At different times we have spelt out these goals as a co-operative commonwealth, a welfare state, a mixed economy, a socialistic pattern of society and, lastly, as democratic socialism. If the Congress as the ruling party has resolved to designate its policy as such, there are other parties advocating communistic solutions such as the nationalization of industries, banking, and insurance, and though land is not specifically mentioned as suitable for nationalization, even that is not ruled out of consideration. There are those advocating freer enterprise and less of statism. Broadly speaking, however, there is no special pleading by any organized section for "capitalism" in the classical sense or for a pristine capitalist economy.

National objectives and policies have to be disciplined by the fundamental consideration that they should help to promote the objectives of ensuring the happiness of individuals in the social sphere, safeguarding individual liberty in the Constitutional and legal spheres, preventing exploitation of man by man and of group by group in the economic sphere, and ensuring equality of opportunity for all citizens to advance themselves.

We have convinced ourselves, as citizens in other democratic countries have, that the fundamental rights guaranteed to individual citizens under the Constitution are not and cannot be absolute and unconditional but should in their interpretation be reconcilable with the social and public interest, with social progress and social justice. While protecting individuals against arbitrary executive actions or against social or economic oppression, by implication the fundamental rights are not intended to impede realization of the objectives embodied in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. Broadly, the Bhuvaneshwar Congress resolution on democratic socialism conforms to this reasoning.

The basic consideration, therefore, is that the State should become the

instrument for equalizing opportunities, through legislative and administrative action, and that this objective should be achieved through the democratic parliamentary process. Democratic socialism aims at the achievement of these desirable economic and social objectives and rules out of court resort to unconstitutional or extra-constitutional methods by any group or section for achieving them. If violence or conflict among classes or groups is ruled out, equally ruled out is the exercise of unbridled power by individuals or groups in the economic or political spheres, leading to individual or group dictatorship.

We may broadly agree that "Democratic Socialism" aims at steering a middle course between individualism-cum-capitalism and communism-cum-totalitarianism, which represent extreme polarizations, and that it constitutes the middle path — the golden mean. Nevertheless following the middle path is invariably a difficult exercise, and the golden mean represents a scheme of things which is difficult to attain in this work-a-day world. In a parliamentary democracy like India's in particular, there is no royal road to the achievement of this balance between extreme positions, because the parliamentary system predicates the existence of political parties professing different ideologies and advocating different policies, some to the right of centre and some to the left of centre. By the same token it is difficult also precisely to define the meaning and content of democratic socialism, because both democracy and socialism are concepts which can have different meanings and implications in different contexts.

In India we are trying to reconcile the two, so that the resultant state of affairs may be acceptable to large sections of the people and facilitate realization of the socialistic objectives without the need to overstep the limits of democratic action. We are trying to link it with some simple criteria, which steer clear of the involved dialectic of orthodox Marxism and the outmoded Adam-Smithian doctrine of *laissez-faire*. We are trying to do this through the formulation of a programme which postulates State action in defined spheres of national activity for elimination of social and economic inequalities, and facilitates the march towards a welfare state in a planned manner.

These criteria can be summed up as follows: provision of equal facilities to all sections of the people for education, employment, and social advancement, and prevention of concentration of economic power in a few hands through State regulation of corporate industry and other productive agencies; elimination of monopolies and monopolistic trends in industrial, business, or other organization; progressive extension of the public sector in key industries and power development, and public control over significant areas of economic power; maximum utilization of technology for augmenting production and lessening the burdens of manual labour. In

the social sphere the aim is the elimination of social inequalities through legislation on the one hand and extensive State-aided or State-implemented welfare activities on the other. Lastly, we aim at the realization of scheduled constitutional objectives and the safeguarding of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution through a firm adherence to the Rule of Law.

That these objectives are worth pursuing cannot be denied. They stem from a positive respect for law and our traditional acceptance of the ideal of human dignity and the dignity of the individual. They are also a sequel to the realization that economic progress cannot be achieved or sustained in a vacuum but only as complementary to social progress. Democratic Socialism presupposes and postulates that economic development should proceed side by side with social development, and that both are the outcome of economic and social disciplines implemented within the framework of the national Constitution. The Constitution has created the instrumentalities for it in the form of a supreme Legislative organ, the Parliament, the Executive acting as its agent in implementing policies laid down, while the Judiciary performs the watch-dog function of ensuring that both the Legislature and the Executive act fairly within their respective spheres, that specific policies for economic progress and social justice do not infringe fundamental rights.

In the interrelationship among these three organs we have a balanced distribution of State power to achieve the supreme objective of socialistic progress as well as social and economic justice without compromising the ideal of individual freedom and liberty.

There is, however, no doubt that in the social and economic situation in India we find some practical impediments to the attainment of the conditions which, broadly speaking, constitute democratic socialism. The power of wealth is still dominant in a wide area of our national life. Conditions of economic monopoly exist which enable the rich to become richer though it does not follow that the poor are becoming poorer. Through the series of Five-year Plans which, in a developing economy like ours, are the means for transferring a traditionally feudal or non-socialistic economy into a progressively egalitarian economy, through fiscal and taxation measures, through legislative measures for curbing concentrations of wealth and power, through land legislation imposing ceilings on land ownership and so on, the previously existing monopolistic and feudalistic trends are being controlled. Valuable data on the subject of how much influence monopolistic conditions exert on economic growth and development and how they tend to defeat the ideal of equality of opportunity will be available when the Commission on Monopolies set up by the Government of India makes its report.

The Five-year Plans provide for a continually expanding area of welfare effort to ameliorate conditions of social degradation and backwardness and to promote by positive measures, undertaken or aided by the State, for the welfare of socially backward and the traditionally weaker sections of the community. If the impact of these measures on the social situation is not yet very conspicuous, it is because of the prolonged backwardness and poverty in which these sections have lived, which unfortunately sometimes breed a predilection on their part to make a vested interest of even backwardness.

Social and economic equality is being progressively ushered in by the advance of technological knowledge and scientific progress. To make large economically backward and opportunity-deprived sections of India's population technology-conscious is a necessarily protracted process. But in industry as also in agriculture technological disciplines are being progressively introduced and are being warmly welcomed by workers, the so-called backward and economically hindered groups of agriculturists, and others.

The ideal of democratic socialism would be a plant whose growth can become stunted unless conditions conducive to its taking deep roots are fostered. One of the conditions which can impede its growth is the continued prevalence of the socio-economic evils of bureaucratic corruption and administrative incompetence. If socialistic programmes involve an extension of the public sector and the sphere of State action to accelerate the pace of economic progress and development, social welfare, and creation of large opportunities in education, in the propagation of the benefits of public health measures, and so on, it also implies the existence of an administration inspired by a social purpose and free from susceptibility to corruption in discharging its tasks. The evils of bureaucratization and corruption should be destroyed by public opinion asserting itself through Parliament and the State Legislatures and other forums of public opinion. It is the essence of the scheme that the people's will expressed through democratic processes functions effectively against all anti-public trends.

In the realization of democratic socialism, which accents orderly transition from a capitalistic to a socialistic economy, the co-operative movement can play a massive role. In our Five-year Plans the co-operative movement is accorded a prominent place as the instrument for achieving a large number of economic and social objectives, especially in the rural sphere, where a traditional agricultural economy has to be transformed into an economy which makes use of technology as the basis of progress, and where the traditional agencies for provision of agricultural credit, marketing of agricultural produce, processing of agricultural commodities and distribution and sale of foodgrains have to be emancipated from the grip of usuri-

ous money-lending, wholesale distribution, and other associated interests. Co-operative organization with its democratic basis should be rapidly substituted for these traditional institutions, thereby achieving the double objective of curbing monopoly and preventing the need for direct intervention by the State in rural economic development.

At the moment, however, despite intensive efforts to strengthen the co-operative structure and to entrust it with large functions in stabilizing our rural economy, almost insuperable hurdles still have to be crossed before the objective is attained. Institutionally it has to be consolidated; ideologically it should be oriented to undertake these extended responsibilities. More and more through co-operative education and training of personnel the working of co-operative institutions should be so moulded that they would be actuated by the "no profit" motive, if the movement is to serve its purpose within the socialistic and democratic framework and ensure that the interests of the weaker, the less privileged, and the unprotected groups are safeguarded and their condition ameliorated.

The ruling Congress party's advocacy of democratic socialism as a corrective to the monopolistic, capitalistic, and exploitative trends that are latent in the Indian economic and social organization in crucial sectors of national life ensures that the concept has powerful supporters. But the implementation of programmes to achieve it has to contend against the inexorable consideration that, even in the ruling party, its acceptance is not universal and that in the larger arena of national politics it has to contend against the opposition, not so much on the plane of theory as in its practical operation, of other parties which, even if they do not profess a blatantly individualistic-capitalistic-monopolistic philosophy, do not look with favour on the extension of State power in the national economic or social life.

It would, therefore, appear essential that a certain consensus should emerge among all political parties and groups who matter in national life, to enable democratic socialism to strike roots. This consensus should arise from a realization that from the practical, fundamentally essential standpoint that social and economic progress can be achieved in an undeveloped economy like ours only if there is an intelligent and undogmatic reconciliation of the mutually conflicting postures and positions implicit in the prevailing economic dogmas of capitalism, Marxism, free enterprise, and so on, and that it provides the only way for the country to emerge from a state of backwardness into that of relative and rapid progress. If the need for a minimum of social regulation or control is agreed upon by all parties it would then be time for the people to decide whether socialism should imply less or more State interference in economic and social matters, and less or more State control over the productive apparatus, and what the rel-

ative areas of the public and the private sector should be and so on.

A safeguard against ideology running away with enthusiasm for more and more State control, State interference, and State capitalism — if one may describe it so — would be to apply the yardstick of their relevance *vis-à-vis* the Constitutional provisions to all measures designed for economic and social progress, because the Constitution is the fountain source of all our national endeavour. If individual measures successfully pass the test, they should be considered good enough. It may be objected that the Constitution could be manipulated by a powerful ruling party to suit its own ideological postures. But that cannot be a conclusive objection because the Constitution itself postulates impliedly the possibility of any one party becoming the ruling party through popular support and its utilizing the machinery of the State to restore any imbalances it may find in national life. However, under the minimum consensus desiderated, we may presume that no party would dare reverse the gears to such an extent that it would imply a fundamental departure from the accepted minimum. It would in fact be impossible for it to do that without provoking a revolution.

In India, the ideal of democratic socialism should be subject to one imperative, namely, that its implementation should conform to Indian traditions and values of life, which are basically ethical and moralistic in character. If this is practicable, we will perhaps be making a unique contribution to the political and economic thought of the world.

The Bhuvaneshwar Congress resolution sums up the implications of the Congress ideal of democratic socialism as the establishment of a society

> wherein poverty, disease, and ignorance shall be eliminated, wherein property and privilege in any form occupy a strictly limited place, wherein all citizens have equal opportunities and wherein ethical and spiritual values contribute to the enrichment of the individual and community life.

This is as valid a list of legitimate and desirable objectives as one could wish to see implemented and attained. They should be consistently striven after.

C. V. H. Rao

There is
One great society alone on earth:
The noble Living and the noble Dead.
—Wordsworth

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

MANIFESTATIONS OF POETRY *

THE subject of the symposium, whose proceedings are now so attractively published, is at once too narrow and too wide. The adjectives seem to qualify and constrict, but the substantive — "poetry" — admits of infinite ramifications. What is poetry? Why does a Hölderlin, a Schiller, or a Rilke — a Blake, a Coleridge, or a Yeats — a Tagore, a Bharati, or an Aurobindo — say what he says as poetry when prose might have been less trouble to him and to us? In fact, why does he wish to say it at all? Obviously he cannot help it; the poem insists on being written! Confrontation with "reality" (the "facts" of outer or inner experience) merely starts the process. Once started, the poetic process becomes a function of both "reality" and the "poet"; and when the "creation" is complete, the poem is more than the piece of reality that provoked it, and more than the poet who created it — just as the "naked, newborn babe" is other than mother and father (being a piece of marvellous realization or discovery to them both), and also — because it is naked, newborn, cherub-like — of timeless, of eternal, significance. The writing of a poem is not saying something alone; it is doing something, creating something. And the poem also does something to *us*, giving us new ears and eyes, knocking us down and lifting us up, and helping us to a new awareness of ourselves in relation to the circumambient universe. The "creative vision" of the poet (especially the lyric poet) is the transforming vitalizing power that sees in a chance event, not only the terrible urgency of the present, but also the vivid images of both Time past and Time future. Even personal discomfiture or pain or shame, when processed into poetry, acquires an autonomous life, mind, and soul of its own, and effects in the poet himself a *katharsis* (or "beyonding") of the raging inner fires. It is the *Yoga* of renewal through immolation; it is the burning of *Kāma*; it is the passage from darkness to light, from the pursuing furies to the haven of peace.

In the symposium under review, conducted in seven sessions and comprising thirteen papers (followed by discussions), most of the questions relevant to an intelligent study of poetry come up for consideration.

Professor L. C. Knights shows with apt examples that poetry could be "discovery" — not for the reader alone but even for the poet himself. Meaning is of the intellect, poetry is not. All the currents of the hidden unconscious struggle to come up, all the heavens of Reality come down in a torrent. The poet is himself taken aback, or he feels emancipated — and so do we. No wonder, as Professor H. Salinger argues, "translations" of poetry, although necessary, are foredoomed to failure, unless we set a poet to catch a poet — and perhaps even then. Meaning can be translated, but not the tremors of the heart nor the perturbations or serenities of the soul.

In his absorbing paper on "Autobiography and Biography in the Lyric," Professor Schoolfield shows how Rilke tried to master the daimon within by giving it a habitation and a name in some of his later lyrics. Discoursing on "Non-representational Modern German Poetry," Professor Allemann points out that word-sequences without ap-

* *Reality and Creative Vision in German Lyrical Poetry*. Edited by A. CLOSS. (Colston Papers No. 15. Butterworths, London. 234 pp. 1963. 40s.)

parent relevance to recognizable actuality may nevertheless aspire to the condition of pure mathematics. Here the creative vision, while divorcing itself from "reality," projects a reality of its own which is sovereign in its own right — a new world of ordered intensities discovered by the poet and open to our exploration.

The papers on Nietzsche (Professor Williams), Brockes (Professor Mainland) and Schiller (Professor (Garland), by sleight of hand, raise certain fundamental problems also. For example, a poet's revision of his poetry (say, Schiller's) — is it born of a new vision, or is it no more than a matter of verbal improvement and metrical adjustment? Shri-Aurobindo is said to have "revised" *Savitri* about a dozen times, each new version lifting the poem to a higher and still higher level of consciousness. Speaking on "Eighteenth-century German Hymnic Verse," Professor Bockman carries the argument to Hölderlin, in whom "we can recognize the manner in which modern poetry can take language beyond the expression of emotion." In his interesting paper, Dr. Prawer enunciates the view that poetry is charged with the "uncanny" when it springs from the depths and is touched by the "numinous" when it pours from the heights: and

> both may take us to the very limits of possible experience and bring us up against transcendent principles at which the wisest of us can only guess.

Such poetry is verily "Medusa's Mirror," as Professor Closs has named it, a mating of terror and beauty, of hell and heaven.

In his short paper the poet Richard Church lays pointed stress on the importance of the *word* — "that elusive medium through which the poet works." Professor Aler guardedly argues that, although the modern poet may not explicitly use traditional myths, he cannot escape the mythical consciousness itself — for science has by no means outdated myth. Professor Peacock mentions organic unity, philosophical awareness, and "novelty" as the three factors that determine our judgement when we approach a poem. In other words, a poem has a recognizable living body, a mind sending out creepers of understanding that embrace the whole world, and, above all, that utter immaculate freshness (or soul-quality) that we associate with the "naked, new-born babe."

In the concluding address on "Concealment and Revelation in Modern German Lyrical Poetry," Professor Closs, the Director of the Symposium, orchestrates the divers notes into a brilliant symphony.

In the ultimate analysis, poetry is seen to be a mystery, even as life is a mystery, to be apprehended not otherwise than through paradoxes. The art of concealment in poetry is also the art of subtle revelation, like a dress worn with arresting elegance and poise. In poetry one dies almost to give new life; one imprisons a moment to emancipate it from the tyranny of the here and now. The poet, like the Angel in St. John, v (as pointed out by Professor Closs), descends into the troubled waters so that, as in the Indian story of the churning of the ocean, after the poison has first spent itself out, the true nectar may be raised to our lips. To transform ugliness into beauty, defeat into victory, death into immortality, what are the poet's bows, arrows, and incantations? Only words, those strange combinations of sounds. But words in the poet's hands become winged squadrons of the spirit. And as they wing down from the "overhead" regions, they become the *mantra*, the pure creative force that makes out of the shadows of evanescence the "nurslings of immortality." Everyday reality suddenly glows as the incandescence of Allegory, and everyday speech trembles as the language of the gods.

K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar

"EARLY BUDDHIST THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE"*

A VOLUME on the early Buddhist theory of knowledge running into over five hundred pages was in any case not likely to be light reading. Larded with dry dissertations and criticisms of little-known epistemological speculations, it is heavy going. The book has undoubted merits: scholarship of a high order, indefatigable industry, languistic competence, and sound judgement. But it would have gained in clarity and usefulness had it been cut down to half its present size; and this could have been done without detracting from its undoubted merits.

The book consists of nine chapters; three of which are devoted to a consideration of the historical background of Buddhist thought in the Vedic and Upaniṣadic tradition. The author is of the view that Upaniṣadic thought was known to Buddhism and had an impact on it, and he dates the rise of Buddhism somewhat before the *Maitri Upaniṣad*. Evidently he does not see eye to eye with Hume, who finds evidence of Buddhist influence in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka, Muṇḍaka,* and *Praśna Upaniṣads*. His final conclusion, with which we are inclined to agree, is that the rise of Buddhism is not far removed in time from, though it is prior to, the *Maitri Upaniṣad*.

The author then proceeds to consider the influence of the Materialistic school and the doctrines of the Sceptics, Ajivikas, and Jainas on Buddhist thought. The materialist proclaimed Vedic literature utterly false and self-contradictory. The Buddhist criticism of the Vedic tradition, while it condemned the ritualism of the Vedas and the animal sacrifices which constituted a large part of the ritual, conceded that some of the Vedic teachings were in fact true and should be accepted after proper scrutiny and personal experience. The Materialists insisted on the validity of perception alone and denied inference and other forms of knowledge. Furthermore they denied the validity of moral and religious observances and the reality of any experience which is not verifiable by the five senses. The Sceptics went even further and doubted the possibility of apprehending absolute truth. When the Sceptics were faced with a variety of conflicting theories, they came to the conclusion that none of them can be known to be true since all may be false and there is no criterion for deciding which was true. The Jaina attitude is that each of these conflicting theories may contain an element of truth and as such be partly true and partly false, or true from one point of view and false from another.

Against this background of general scepticism, the Buddhist attitude is one of profound faith in moral values and the certainty of attaining truth through logical as well as supralogical means. *Śīla* is the basis of the spiritual life and the highest intuition is possible only to a mind purified through the practice of the primary virtues included in the *Pañca-śīla*. *Śīla, Samādhi,* and *Prajñā* are the stages in the development of the spiritual life, and without moral purity no progress in the spiritual path is possible. But *Śīla* is only a preliminary step in the path and is by no means either the goal or the end of the spiritual life. Ultimately *Prajñā, bodhi,* is the goal of the *sādhaka*; and is the only means of release from the round of births and the attainment of *Nirvana*.

Prajñā does not exclude or render superfluous the functions of the critical intellect or the open mind which is prepared to make a critical and comparative study of various doctrines and religious experiences. The Buddhist attitude to faith is one of sympathetic acceptance, later to be subjected to critical examination and personal experience. Buddhism is often described as a Religion of Reason because of the

* *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*. By K. N. JAYATILLEKE. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 519 pp. 1963. 70s.)

emphasis laid on critical examination and intellectual analysis of religious experience. But reason and the critical intellect alone cannot give us ultimate truth. This is possible only through the higher functions of *Samādhi* and *Prajñā*. Meditative practices which lead to extra-sensory perception and later to *Samādhi* and *Prajñā* are the ultimate goal of the spiritual life. Buddhists have always recognized the validity of the mystical experience and the possibility of acquiring para-normal and extra-sensory powers which are also an important and valid means of acquiring the highest type of knowledge. The theory behind this is that when the mind is cleansed of its impurities, it acquires these super-normal powers spontaneously.

Dr. Jayatilleke puts it this way, and we may regard the passage as a résumé of the book:

> The gross defilements consist of misconduct with regard to body, speech, or mind; the medium defilements are sensuous thoughts, thoughts of destruction and ill-will; the subtle defilements consist of attachment to one's race, country, egotism. Spiritual thoughts alone remain; when these defilements are got rid of, the mind is stayed within and he directs it in the exercise of the six forms of higher knowledge. These experiences are had after attaining the supreme perfection of equanimity and mindfulness which is characteristic of the fourth *jhana*.

Altogether this is a volume which deserves and repays careful study.

B. V. NARAYANA REDDY

Ways to Self-Realization: A Modern Evaluation of Occultism and Spiritual Paths. By MOUNI SADHU. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London. 242 pp. 1963. 25*s*.)

"Self-realization" is a dubious term, because "self" has such different meanings. Mouni Sadhu means by it "the finding of the Truth within ourselves," a truth which is

> eternal and independent of all known states, such as the physical or waking state of consciousness and those still usually unknown conditions of our awareness, the astral and mental planes and others described by occultists.

To discover this "true Self of Being," as he calls it, means for him "to discover and be God."

That is a large claim and, unless very carefully qualified, a dangerous one. He justifies it by quoting a saying of Shri-Ramana-Maharshi, his chosen Master. "To see God," said the Maharshi, "is *to be* God." And in reply to those who argue "that Man being one of the manifestations of the Supreme can never reflect Him in the imperfect and limited human form" Mouni Sadhu contends that "by going out from his temporary shells, man can raise himself to the heights of consciousness which we call — God."

But even if it were possible for Man during his earthly incarnation to abstract himself entirely from his body and to exist as pure spirit, is he justified in claiming thereby to *be* God? Surely the presumptuousness implicit in such a claim is enough to disprove it. For, as thousands of devout and humble souls have testified, it is only through an acknowledgement of our own nothingness, even on the highest level of consciousness to which we may attain, that we can awake to God's presence within us. Surely the infinite Spirit which informs all creation must transcend the capacity of comprehension of any one of its creations. Even at his most godlike Man is still human and, as such, a relative being. To be in the closest possible union of communion with the Absolute within him is, indeed, the goal towards which humanity must strive. But for the creature to claim to *be* its Creator unless or until it has ceased to be human and has merged indistinguishably in its Source, would seem to betray a questionable lack of humility and also to be unrealistic.

It may be, of course, as Mouni Sadhu suggests, that such doubts and scruples do "not exist on the level of consciousness above that of mind" and that only someone whose "*attainment is complete*" can know that he *is* God. But can human attainment ever be "complete"? Is it even in the author of this book or in others who, like him, have basked in the light of a Master? Is it in "the Master" himself? The style of Mouni Sadhu's writing, devoid as it is of grace or subtle insight, hardly suggests this. He is certainly an assured expounder of the Advaita system and he applies it to many aspects of life with rational cogency. Characteristically he represents what he calls the "equation of the Spirit" in a mathematical formula which indicates how spiritual awareness increases as sensation, feeling, and thought decrease. But spiritual awareness cannot be measured quantitatively — it is qualitative, and the Perfect Man "whose everyday consciousness is all the time the spiritual one" has not ceased to feel and think through his body or come to live in some high abstraction. Rather he has learnt to spiritualize all the channels through which, as a man, he can experience life creatively from the humblest to the highest.

Mouni Sadhu, who has first-hand experience of the occult realm as well as of the spiritual, so far as these can be divided, knows, of course, that the true centre, when it is found, excludes nothing, but brings all into a right relationship. The talks, of which his book is composed, are more informative than intimately revealing. But on certain subjects, such as death, he evokes the depths, and he has much to say about the adventure of transforming consciousness which is instructive.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET

Jean-Paul Sartre: To Freedom Condemned: A Guide to His Philosophy. By JUSTUS STRELLER. Translated by WADE BASKIN. (Philosophical Library, New York. 163 pp. 1960. $3.00)

Jean-Paul Sartre is perhaps the most versatile and profound among modern French intellectuals. Playwright, novelist, and critic, he created a sensation in the philosophic world with his profound analysis of the human situation in his *L'Être et le Néant*. This extremely difficult and involved book was translated into English thirteen years later by Hazel E. Barnes under the title: *Being and Nothingness*, brought out by the present publishers. Borrowing largely from Husserl, Heidegger, and Hegel, Sartre has out-speculated the Germans with a depth and virtuosity all his own. (The book was reviewed by the present reviewer in these columns in December 1956.) This book is an attempt to bring together and relate the main topics of the bigger book, so as to serve as an introduction to Sartre's thought. The title is adapted from Sartre's oft-quoted statement: "Man is condemned to be free."

This short book is subdivided into as many as forty sections including the Translator's Introduction. (The able German author, Dr. Justus Streller, is no more.) The longest sections are those relating to "Man" and the very last: "Synopsis: Sartre's World." Not the least valuable parts of the book are the full list of references to topics (which takes the place of an Index) and a Glossary which explains the key-terms.

It would obviously be impossible to give here even a summary of Sartre's philosophy; nor is it necessary. Although classed popularly under the rubric Existentialism, it may as well be designated Non-existentialism: such is the crucial importance Sartre attributes to the concept of Nothingness in his scheme. Nothingness is defined as the non-presence of something: which has striking affinity with the Indian concept of *Abhāva*. Being is its antithesis. Sartre's analysis hinges on the distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself. Being-in-itself contains a potentiality of nihilation (*néantization*), of

evoking nothingness.

As observed on the last occasion, the analogies with ancient Indian thought are intriguing, although the two are in altogether different dimensions. The initial pessimism and the stress on freedom are common. The unauthentic state of human being reminds us of the notion of *Saṁsāra*. The function of nihilation brings to mind the function of the famous Upaniṣadic "*Neti, neti,*" and also recalls the Tantric concept of *Śakti* as the aspect of Negation: *Niṣedha vyāpāra rūpā śaktiḥ*. The title of the original book suggests the basic Indian categories of *Sat* and *Asat*, while the notion of a primary consciousness (*Samvit*) and a reflected ego (*Aham*) are parallel to the polarity of *Prakāśa* and *Vimarśa*.

In the present book Dr. Justus Streller has distilled and arranged in orderly, readily accessible fashion the substance of Sartre's study of man's psychological and emotional being and the meaning of his struggle for freedom.

That is what the publishers say in their notice; and it is strictly just.

K. Guru Dutt

Essays of a Humanist. By Julian Huxley. (Chatto and Windus, London. 288 pp. 1964. 30*s*.)

Sir Julian is a man with a mission. He is acutely aware that man, either by some dramatic folly, or by passive neglect, which will be slower but no less sure, is in danger of destroying life on this planet. He is equally convinced that man now has it in his power to guide the world to a better and happier future. This is the unifying theme of the dozen essays which make up this important book.

The grounds of his anxiety are shared by most of us. They are the threat of war, atomic, chemical, or bacteriological: the contamination of the planet by artificial increase of radiation; the misuse of the soil, the squandering of our resources of coal and oil, the destruction of wild life, both plant and animal; and, above all, the population explosion. Where Sir Julian differs from most of us is in the firmness of his grasp of the problems, the fulness of his readiness to come forward with a solution. He not only offers enlightenment; he gives courage.

Two world wars have produced the demand for a world religion, of which the ecumenical movement is a contemporary manifestation. But mutual comprehension and toleration between existing religions are not enough. A great part of the world, especially of the more technically advanced peoples, is indifferent to any existing form of religion. A new religion is called for; and Sir Julian, as a scientist, comes forward to suggest the form it might take. "Science," he says, "can become the ally of religion.... It can provide a 'scientific' theology, a scientifically-ordered framework of belief, to whatever new religion emerges...." "What the world now needs," he continues, "is not merely a rationalistic denial of the old but a religious affirmation of something new." The something new, for Sir Julian, is evolutionary humanism.

I find it impossible not to respond to his plea. The concept of evolution, with its three great phases, inorganic, biological, and psycho-social, has now become so rich and all-embracing that it must influence, and control, the thinking of every modern mind. I would only suggest that its novelty is less than might appear at first sight, and that evolutionary humanism can be heartily embraced by those who quarrel less with the traditional conception of God than Sir Julian does. His plea is that man has now become the dominant species of life on earth and must assume responsibility for the planet. I know with what a wealth of modern knowledge Sir Julian's conviction is strengthened. But I cannot but recall that in the first chapters of Genesis already man was given dominion over the rest of crea-

tion. We cannot do without modern science, but we shall understand it better if we do not exaggerate its novelty. The more a revolution in thought can preserve a sense of continuity the better its chance of success.

B. FARRINGTON

PLAUTUS: *The Rope and Other Plays.* Translated by E. F. WATLING. (The Penguin Classics, L 136. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, England. 284 pp. 1964. 5*s*.)

The special virtue of Mr. E. F. Watling's translations of the Greek and Roman plays is that in his hands they become English plays; he makes them, that is to say, speakable and actable in contemporary English for contemporary English audiences. Indeed he probably does with these four plays by Plautus very much what Plautus did with their Greek originals: he renews them in another time and language, yet keeps their comic spirit and their essentially dramatic quality. This is not to question his scholarship; rather it is to question the comic and dramatic understanding and capabilities of some other translators. In this volume the *Amphitryo* (for instance) is so funny, even on the printed page where it does not properly belong, that one ardently wishes to see it on the stage, where it does. All suspicion that "Latin plays" are stuffy and for the classroom disappears; these four comedies (the others are the *Mostellaria* [The Ghost] and the *Trinummus* [A Three-dollar Day], as well as the *Rudens* [The Rope]) call at once for producers, actors, and audiences to make manifest again the life which still inspires them. Mr. Watling (who writes an excellent introduction to his translations) is to be congratulated; and so are Penguin Books, to whose series of the classics in English this is a lively and valuable addition.

R. H. WARD

The Gulistan or Rose Garden of Sa'di. Translated by EDWARD REHATSEK. Edited with a Preface by W. G. ARCHER. Introduction by G. M. WICKENS. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 265 pp. 1964. 42*s*.)

The Sheikh Muslih-uddin Sa'di Shirazi, the great Persian poet, lived in the thirteenth century, but his frankness, humour and deep sympathy with the frailties of ordinary men are in tune with our own modern way of thinking. His down-to-earth humanity, expressed in the bluntest terms, must have shocked some of the orthodox Muslims of his day. Nevertheless during his long life of writing he reached great heights of venerability and fame.

The Gulistan contains a large number of brief, parable-like stories interspersed with short verses pointing the moral. The language in translation may sound archaic and often uninspiring to our ears, but the sentiments are warm and vital. Hidden meanings are sometimes so compressed that we may miss them, but there is much that we can grasp very easily.

Charity and hatred of hypocrisy characterize Sa'di's writings. He seems far more concerned with letting these qualities speak than with turning a polished phrase for himself. Although I cannot pretend that I should want to read this book over and over again, it has made one of the great teachers of the past very near and real to me. This may be the greatest merit of this book, that though Sa'di as a poet may not have much appeal today, it lets us see clearly the very likable man, and we cannot but profit from knowing him.

D. S. MAXTED

A New Look at the Bible Tradition. By LOUIS V. BISCHOFF (Philosophical Library Inc., New York. 380 pp. 1963. $7.50)

The strength of Christianity seems to be that it has lasted two thousand years in spite of science, rationalism, Soviet communism, and — shall we say? — Unitarianism as expounded by the author.

This is a serious attempt at a refutation of some of the dogmas of Christianity. The author shows that the Book of Genesis follows the Avesta (p. 56); that Eve in the Bible is a variation of the earlier Sumerian myth (p. 64); the description of the Fall of Man is an earlier tale (p. 73); that the Bible is not the word of God (p. 100); that Mary is described as "a young woman" and not "virgin" in the oldest MSS. of the Bible (p. 104); that the Gospel of St. John is full of "forgeries" (Ch. VI); that the two versions of the Ten Commandments are full of inconsistencies (p. 300); and that the whole of the Christian doctrine, as it is now formulated, has so many weaknesses and perversions that it cannot be accepted.

Unfortunately the author's language is rather intemperate, and he is particularly fond of words like "forgeries" and "lies." This reduces the weight of the attack, and brings the book within the list of somewhat virulent polemical literature. Recently the *Cambridge History of the Bible* has given us a scientific account of the textual problems, and this book suffers by comparison.

A valuable part of the book is the formulation of the Unitarian faith by the author, namely: monotheism; rejection of the Trinity and the Immaculate Conception; personal immortality; the validity of Reason; the belief in absolute morality; the supreme power of faith; and the primacy of Love, Kindliness, and Good Will.

The author's effort would have been more effective had there been less animus. It is this animus, this hankering after proving "forgeries" and "perversions," which detract from the merit of the book. After reading this book one is left with the feeling that after all it would be more worth while to read *Honest to God* and follow it up with *Objections to Christianity* by the Cambridge team.

A. A. A. FYZEE

Sri Aurobindo Came To Me (Reminiscences). By DILIP KUMAR ROY. (Jaico Publishing House, Bombay, 237 pp. Second ed., 1964. Rs. 2.50)

To Shri-Aurobindo Dilip Kumar Roy was "a friend and a son." To Shri Roy, the Master was Gurudev. This unique relationship sustained by constant psychic association and exchange of letters has been glimpsed in Shri Roy's essay on Shri-Aurobindo in *Among the Great.* This book is not a chronological diary or a cogent exposition. It is a sustained monologue which reveals the effulgence of the Seer's many-sided personality through the reflecting glass of Shri Roy's discipleship. Dilip is the noble, reluctant rebel becalmed by Shri-Aurobindo's grace of Light. The ego has to be mastered, a total surrender has to be effected. Dilip's Dantesque journey into the Aurobindonian worlds of *Yoga* makes fascinating reading. He passes through infernal despair and dejection, scales the purgatorial self-questionings and hesitations, and basks in the paradisal warmth of Shri-Aurobindo's Love. The Master, like a Virgil-Beatrice, guides this questing Dante with unerring facility through letters and interviews. He mixes humour and serious advice as the occasion demands. Now and then it transcends all these and a silent miraculous gesture achieves the desired effect.

The constant conflict ends at last in total surrender to the Guru, at once the easiest and most difficult thing to do. Surrender needs a complete Faith in the Guru and Faith according to Shri-

Aurobindo is not a mental state but "something spiritual, a knowledge of the soul." The Faith and the consequent Surrender to Shri-Aurobindo — when did they come about in Dilip's life? Of course Faith and Surrender were there from the beginning and the rebellion was the vital's, not the soul's. In this, Dilip resembles Swami Vivekananda most. And like that tempestuous Sannyasi, Dilip's too has been a magnetic personality expressing itself in the songs he sings to Lord Krishna and in the words he writes to disseminate his knowledge of the Soul. This spiritual odyssey is a unique record, and as Professor Srinivasa Iyengar says in his foreword it is an "indispensable book to all admirers of Shri-Aurobindo; all students of Yoga; all lovers of poetry; and all serious practitioners of the creative art of Life."

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

Cozzens. By D. E. S. MAXWELL. (119 pp.); *C. P. Snow*. By JEROME THALE. (112 pp.) (Writers and Critics Series. Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London. 1964. 5*s*. each.)

Two additions to a now well-established paperback series, "Writers and Critics," edited by A. Norman Jeffares. Dealing with the American novelist first, it can be said at the outset that Mr. Maxwell's examination and discussion of the best-selling author of *By Love Possessed*, first published in 1957 and now available in Penguin Books, scarcely justifies this author's inclusion in a series devoted largely to writers of classic or near-classic stature. When *S. S. San Pedro* was published in 1931 shrewd critics drew attention in no uncertain terms to the arrival of talent beyond the ordinary. Mr. Maxwell discusses with care and sympathy nearly everything his author has done, in fluent style, and with some telling quotations. Interesting as the book is, one is left with doubt, when one comes to the final bibliography, whether James Gould Cozzens is likely to be read by future generations.

The case of C. P. Snow is not so difficult. Sir Charles Snow's contribution to the English novel, and to general scientific discussion, is considerable. His studies in men and power have given him an incontestable place at the head of English fictional writers who at once command the respect of the intellectual and the success of the popular author. Jerome Thale's six chapters help the discerning reader to understand why this should be.

In his most interesting generalizing chapter on "Snow and the Liberal Context," for example, he summarizes this author as

> a remarkably shrewd and intelligent examiner of character and motive, in particular of the psychological and moral terms of middle-class professional life in our times.

This could not be better put, in that it emphasizes Sir Charles Snow's limitations, for even the greatest novelists must work within a framework, and at the same time points out his strength as a writer of a sequence of novels of the impressive nature of the "Strangers and Brothers" group.

F. SEYMOUR SMITH

What Shall We Do About English? By U. A. ASRANI. (Navajivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad. 48 pp. 1964. 75 *paise*)

This booklet is a plea for the postponement of teaching of English in Indian schools till the beginning of the High School stage and for checking the trend that is developing all over India of introducing it even in the primary stage. The author attempts with very limited success to argue the question on an academic level.

He speaks of the cultural "denational-

ization" which would appear to be the danger of too early emphasis on the learning of a foreign language. But the two historic instances of the flower of India's youth who were trained away from Indian influences turning out to be flaming patriots, shedding their costly acquired English polish, of Aurobindo Ghosh and Jawaharlal Nehru, clearly run counter to this contention.

The author also harps on the bogey of the burden of too many languages having to be learnt at a tender age; but the evidence he adduces proves the contrary, in that children between the ages of seven and fourteen have a special facility for picking up languages. Often educationists and others think of the child's mind as a sort of bag into which if one kind of matter is filled there will be no room for other matter. It is forgotten that the mind is living tissue and is more like a muscle which grows by exercise.

The sincerity of the author is patent, and he has taken great pains to gather his information from authoritative sources, which by their complexity are inconclusive. The author has done useful service in perhaps provoking deeper study of the question.

D. GURUMURTI

The Efficacy of Public Enterprise: Proceedings of the Second Seminar on Public Enterprise, 1962. Edited by V. V. RAMANADHAM. (Allied Publishers Private Ltd., Bombay; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. xii+231 pp. 1963. 25*s*.)

No one now denies the need of government intervention in the economic field. Government participation is necessary whenever private means are insufficient to provide vital social overhead capital goods, as roads, canals, bridges, railways, and the like, or when there is a tendency to invest in non-productive but very lucrative outlets like speculation in real estate. Moreover, in an affluent society where the problem is not one of production, the government has an important role to play in the redistribution of income so that there exists a prudent allocation of the national wealth.

The book under review is a symposium of papers by academic and by practical men on the importance of the public sector in India. The scope of public enterprise in India is discussed and the various methods of government control are examined. One great problem encountered by government-sponsored bodies is that of management. With the profit-motive absent, civil servants, who have usually not had sufficient commercial or industrial experience, have often lacked entrepreneurial spirit.

Several papers deal with public enterprise in regional development, and it would appear that the public sector has allocated capital to industry in much the same way as private investment would have done, i.e., the less industrial regions have been neglected, and this, of course, may be very good economics.

While the discussions are interesting and raise important points, we are not given sufficient data to enable us to judge whether public enterprise in India is, in fact, efficient.

L. DELGADO

Kathakali: An Indigenous Art-Form of Kerala. By K. P. PADMANABHAN TAMPY. (Indian Publications, Calcutta. 30 pp. 1963. Rs. 3.00)

Kathakali is a welcome small book introducing one to the unique dance-form of that name. In a short compass the writer, who has a fine aesthetic understanding, interprets faithfully the intricacies of this great art form. After tracing the origin of Kathakali he discusses *inter alia* the hand poses, cos-

tume, make-up, and other features characteristic of it. Commenting on the elaborate make-up and gorgeous costumes of the Kathakali actors, he observes:

> It takes about three to four hours for this cumbersome and dazzling make-up. An actor has to tie at least eighty knots in the process of dressing!

The section on Kathakali music is succinctly written and is likely to help in understanding the supremely evocative quality of the music that accompanies the dance. The line drawings and the photographs have heightened the value of the book, which will be useful, as Guru Gopinath, the great exponent of Kathakali, says, "to students and lovers of this brilliant exposition of the national genius of Kerala."

DILIP KUMAR SEN

Tasmanian Adventure. By CATHERINE SHEPHERD. Drawings by GRACE HUXTABLE. (J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., London. 156 pp. 1964. 12*s*. 6*d*.)

Tasmania, discovered by a Dutch mariner called Abel Tasman and originally named by him Van Diemen's Land from the Governor of the Dutch East Indies, was, very fittingly, given its present name by the early settlers.

Catherine Shepherd, whose home by adoption is Tasmania, is an authority on early Australian history. This story is fictional, but the author, having made a detailed study of the period, is able to give it an accurate background, and it bears the mark of authenticity.

Written in refreshingly simple English, the book describes the life of the early settlers, and holds the reader's attention throughout. One is made aware of the spirit of dedication that inspired the pioneers, helping them to overcome all obstacles with an unbounded faith in their own future, and that of the new country they were helping to build.

The principal characters are delineated with sensitive sympathy. The Chrome family is seen carving out a new life for themselves with courage and optimism, the one exception among them (for a while) being the nine-year-old daughter, who, rebellion in her heart, is unable and unwilling at first to adapt herself to new conditions, and wants to return to London "to go to dancing classes . . . and to make pincushions!"

The two "assigned servants," as a class of convicts were termed, are well drawn: the city man, scheming and cruel, the other a young English country lad facing the harsh sentence of a life transportation for the petty crime of stealing a sheep, but eventually proving himself worthy of the trust reposed in him.

The serious theme underlying this charming little story gives it an added appeal.

ROSHAN KOTHAWALA

The Story of Chandidas. By PRIYARANJAN SEN. (Indian Publications, Calcutta. 48 pp. 1963. Rs. 3.50)

Chandidas is one of the immortal figures of Bengali literature. He was the lover *par excellence* and the intensity of his love, its illumination, and the fire of its passion have given to his *padavali* a beautiful timbre.

The details of Chandidas's life and career are shrouded in obscurity. The poet himself was naturally reticent on these points, but there is extant a Sanskrit manuscript purporting to be an account of the life of Chandidas, written in the later years of the seventeenth century. On the basis of that manuscript a Bengali poetical work was written about a hundred and fifty years ago. In it a place in Bankura in West Bengal is mentioned as the birthplace of Chandidas. These items of information about the poet are, however, not acceptable to all and there are not a

few who hold the Bengali poem to be spurious.

This book contains a gist of that controversial Bengali poem. This summary came out serially first in *The Modern Review* and then in *The Folklore* and is now being issued in a carelessly printed book after a quarter century. The author feels that the presentation of facts mentioned in that Bengali poem about Chandidas's life and the Basali cult might help readers "in understanding the poet-saint's standpoint and the fusion of the Shakta and Vaishnava cultures." He has been on the whole successful in this endeavour.

DILIP KUMAR SEN

LEAVES FROM A PARIS DIARY

[**Shri Baldoon Dhingra** writes with deep appreciation of the French writer Antoine de Saint-Exupéry and his book, *La Citadelle*.—ED.]

SOME AUTHORS exist as much in their biographies as in their fiction, in their own selves no less than in the selves of their heroes. What they put into words is a version of what they have encountered in their lives, but so organized as to suit their requirements, reconstituted, and dominated by creative intention. Their dreams ricochet from a hostile reality, and, projected into the more pervious substance of the novel, then unfurl their buds and freely proliferate. Literature, for the story-teller, is both an extension of his own existence, and his revenge upon it. In it, ambition, pride, sentimentality, indignation, the lust for power, the craving for possessions or for justice, the meaning of duty, joy, and sacrifice, all find it possible to achieve expression. Not Molière's laughter, nor Balzac's idealism, nor Stendhal's alternating moods of irony and tenderness, serve to divert our attention from the men themselves, but rather crown and complete them. Encouraged by the successes which, in their work, they have registered against the world, they face it boldly, and return to the attack enriched with all those resources of the spirit of which the exercise of their craft has made them conscious.

In what category can one place Saint-Exupéry's *La Citadelle*? Was its author a novelist, a poet, or a philosopher? In this great book, Antoine de Saint-Exupéry meditates. He becomes the Prince, the ruler of the empire in the desert. He is no stranger to the "dark night of the soul," for all who ponder on the riddle of existence have undergone such an experience. He knows also that the Great Silence is what all men, for all their chatterings, seek. Words are used to still words; for what is sought is the meaning of things, "the figure in the carpet." At one place he says: "I live not by things but by the meanings of things." He cares nothing for a thing cherished for itself, if it fail to adumbrate the meaning of perfection.

Saint-Exupéry believed in silence; for to him "love is a communion in silence, and to love is to comtemplate." And then he goes on to say:

> For silence is God's cloak spread out upon man's restlessness, and in silence He steeps and soothes their fretful hearts.
>
> I will indite a hymn to thee, O Silence. . . .

He hymns the silence of him who muses, gazing into the middle distance, receiving with expending, and distilling the elixir of thought; the silence that enables him to know and also not to know — for it is sometimes well for him not to know. And then he makes the gradual discovery that his questions have no meaning; for, as he says elsewhere, "love means an end of questionings."

La Citadelle is a book which leaders might read, if they have a will, with the utmost profit. Of peace he says:

As for peace, I impose it not by force. The better part is to convert. If I do but brush my enemy, I stablish him and his undying hate. The better part is to convert; and to convert is to welcome in. It is the offering to each man of a garment to his measure, in which he feels at ease. The same garment for all. For all incoherence is but the lack of genius.

For teachers:

Teach prayer and meditation, for these add virtues to the soul. And the practice of love: for what can replace love?

Strive to break the bonds that tie man to his worldly goods; thus you will stablish the man in the child of Man by teaching him above all to barter himself for something greater than himself — for, otherwise, he is but warped.

It is significant that Saint-Exupéry, unlike many great writers, distrusts the intellect, which so many men have made supreme:

I know well the perils of the intellect, whose dogma is that words can grasp. It is not by way of language that I shall transmit what is within me; for it is inexpressible in words. I can but signify this in so far as you may understand it through other channels than the spoken word. . . .

Of giving:

I bid you live not by what you give; for that alone augments you; you must shape your fruit, and it is pride that sponsors its permanence. Else you would change its colour, savour, fragrance, as the winds list. But for you, your fruit serves nothing; it acquires its value only if it cannot be given back to you. . . . For you can give only that which you can transform, as the tree gives the fruit of the earth which it has transformed.

Unlike so many leaders who want a uniform mass Saint-Exupéry's Prince wants his Holy City to emanate from the very diversity of its component parts. Here is a passage which belongs to the Perennial Philosophy:

For the higher is the truth, the higher you must soar to discern and grasp it. Like a long slope stretching down from a highland to the sea, life is one, yet diverse on each successive level, and transmits its power, stage by stage, from Being to Being. . . . To unify is to bind in an ever firmer knot the diversity of sundry things, not to efface them for the sake of symmetry leading nowhere. . . .

This symmetry leading nowhere is what sociologists would have us bear in mind and some philosophers dread, for are we not here trying through cold technology to make all things alike? Happily, many thinkers are aware of this; but the forces of blank uniformity are strong and are at this very moment gaining strength. One has to stretch out for the life force, Saint-Exupéry says, which comes from above, not from below. "Your pyramid has no meaning unless it culminates in God."

La Citadelle represents Saint-Exupéry's personal philosophy. It was indeed his *œuvre posthume,* one which grew and grew with him wherever he was, in France or North Africa. He was an *homme de synthèse,* "pruning his rose trees" and happy that others prune theirs. He concludes his book, if ever such a book was intended to be concluded, with these words which read almost like a Vedic hymn:

. . . though following different paths, we follow, groping our respective ways, the lines of force of the same inward fervour. And in Thee, O Lord, our paths converge and end as one. . . . For thou art the knot supreme, binding all things together.

BALDOON DHINGRA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."
—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

The malicious cult in biography that takes delight in discovering the "weaknesses" of the great and good, is condemned by David Gourlay in "Snuffing Around in the Inner Life" (*The Guardian,* 16 July 1964):

To think that the mystery of human personality is discovered by searching out "intimate revelations" is like saying that the way to admire a rose is by plucking off the petals. Factual data, even of the most personal kind, is no substitute for love.

Happily it is this insight of love and understanding in the light of universal ethics that Arnold Toynbee brings to his reminiscences and assessment of Jawaharlal Nehru, in *Encounter* (August 1964). He gives a portrait that rings true, of a man who was both great statesman and "lovable human being," whose sense of humour overcame what might well have been bitterness at imprisonment, and who, quite naturally and without smugness, put the Sermon on the Mount into practice.

One must be thankful when a noble soul takes on itself the burden of political leadership, for politics are always in need of redeeming. They are a backward field of human activity in which our average standard of behaviour is decidedly lower than it is in family life or in our professional vocations. A noble soul goes into politics at its peril, for politics are as difficult to redeem as they are in need of redemption. Politics are intractable. They cannot be redeemed in one short lifetime even by one of those rare spirits that combine high idealism with practical genius.... To be caught on the sorrowful wheel is part of the personal price that the statesman-idealist has to pay.

To Nehru a political career was only a *means* of service, and his vision reached beyond India to the welfare of mankind as a whole. He was, Toynbee suggests, one of the great "interpreters and mediators between the civilization of the West and the other living civilizations," with a key role in what seem to be "the birth-throes of a new society, embracing the whole human race."

One might add that, if any worthwhile "new society" is to emerge, politics must cease to be national, party, and power politics, and the men at the head of affairs must change their own values, thus influencing the attitudes and actions of the masses.

To seek to achieve political reforms before we have effected a reform in *human nature, is like putting new wine into old bottles.* Make men feel and recognize in their innermost hearts what is their real, true duty to all men, and every old abuse of power, every iniquitous law in the national policy, based on human, social or political selfishness, will disappear of itself.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY: *The Key to Theosophy*

Toynbee includes Ashoka, Ram Mohan Roy, Gandhi, and Nehru as pioneer statesmen-interpreters, who lead and inspire rather than coerce, and who deserve "to be remembered and immortalized."

An advertisement, addressed "To Scientists and Engineers in Great Britain," appearing in the British press, deserves full publicity. It bears the signatures of over sixty scientists and engineers eminent in their respective fields, though many others, in industry, and in schools, universities, and research institutes, are also supporting the Scientists Protest Fund (A.M. Young, 75 Upper Berkeley Street, London w. 1), which is paying for the advertisement.

It mentions the hopeful signs that the great powers are realizing the dangers of nuclear war. But it emphasizes

the fact that the spread of nuclear weapons increases the threat of that war, and itemizes the terrifying increase in the number and force of nuclear weapons both in the British Services and in Allied Command Europe — "their combined explosive strength is more than 10,000 times the force of nuclear weapons used at the end of the war."

The rich nations spend over 40,000 million pounds annually on military account, which is nearly as much as the entire national income of all the poor nations. It has been estimated that one-fifth of the people in the world are hungry and one-third are malnourished. . . .

A real way to peace would be to divert much of the money now being spent on armaments to agricultural research and education and the equipment needed to make them effective. Beside this there is much urgently needed scientific and engineering work to be done to make this country a more pleasant place in which to live.

We believe that the social responsibility of engineers and scientists is clear. It is first to concentrate their energies on the exploration and development of the world's resources to meet the problems of peace, rather than squander them on preparations for war; and, second, to impress on their colleagues or pupils, when seeking a job, that there are as many opportunities for constructive as for potentially destructive work, even though the latter may be better paid.

This is heart-warming, since it makes a stand against short-sighted power-lunacy and selfishness, as well as against the deadly glamour of "better pay." It is to be hoped, however, that the aim of making "this country a more pleasant place in which to live" is only part of a larger aim that leaves no place unbenefited. And, if some people ask what such a protest can achieve practically, the answer is obvious that all change for the better can only start with a change in the ideas generally held. And only the constant reiteration of true aims and values, with strong conviction, can make the necessary impact on the public mind. It is hoped that many more will join in this Scientists Protest.

The Committee of 100, one of the active nuclear disarmament groups in Britain, has now issued a "change of policy" statement to all its members. It will extend its activities beyond those specifically against war, and use non-violent action against any type of exploitation and injustice. It will consider such aspects as housing, health, communications, transport and industrial relations, as well as education. It favours regional, local, and functional administration, and emphasizes individual responsibility and rights. It proposes discussions between people of different persuasions who yet have some objectives in common. Such broadening of scope is to be welcomed, since it gives a truer perspective than one single aim.

SYMPATHY

A rose my lady plucked for me,
a rose my lady gave to me;
I smelled the rose, returned it whole,
and each found healing for the soul.

WILLIAM EWART WALKER